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In 2010, Public Act 205 was passed and signed into law, revising Michigan
School Code section 1250. This revision required compensation for teachers to be based
on job performance and job accomplishments. Compensation based on performance or
merit is a significant departure from existing practice wherein teachers are paid a step
scale salary based on years of service and educational qualifications. The purpose of this
phenomenological study was to investigate the lived experience of nine superintendents
as it relates to the implementation of section 1250 of PA 205 in their respective districts.
Participants were divided into three categories based on their responsiveness or lack of
responsiveness to this legislative mandate, with the overall intent of uncovering the how
and why these superintendents responded to the school code revision.
Overall, the superintendents in the study supported the concept of merit pay as an
improvement over the current salary and step schedule. Moreover, they supported merit
pay ideologically, as it would increase teacher accountability; however, substantial policy
evasion occurred, with most superintendents not implementing merit pay. Reasons
included concern over the conflict elimination of the salary and step schedule would
cause with the teacher bargaining group, the lack of external sanctions for noncompliance, and limited stakeholder support. Those that did implement merit pay did so

when certain contextual conditions were in place. These conditions included a “policy
champion” at the ISD level who guided the superintendents towards compliance,
collaboration with teachers in the local districts when creating the merit pay models, and
the development of local and unique merit pay programs. The study is concluded with
several recommendations for policymakers and school superintendents who wish to
implement merit pay programs in the future.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
One common topic of education reform today is teacher pay—how much money
teachers make, for what work, and how pay should be determined (Laine, Potemski, &
Rowland, 2010). Teacher pay is primarily based on the input model of compensation,
commonly defined in the collective bargained contract as the “single salary scale and step
schedule” (Porwoll, 1979). The salary and step schedule rewards teachers equally when
they achieve certain levels of longevity and additional training or degrees. Since its
inception, the salary and step schedule has been a nearly constant feature in teacher
compensation. According to Podursky (2007), over 95 percent of the nation’s public
schools maintain the salary and step schedule as the primary approach for determining
teacher pay (p. 909).
Critics of the salary and step schedule contend that this method of determining
compensation is not well aligned with the outcomes of schooling, nor does it increase
teacher effectiveness (Goldhaber, 2002; Hanushek, 1992, 2003; Heyburn, 2010; OCED,
2009; Sanders, 2005; Sanders & Horn, 1994). Instead, these critics call for compensation
to be based on output measures such as student performance and teacher evaluation,
which rewards effective teachers (Ballou, 2001; Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone, 2002).
Such compensation systems typically are described as performance-based compensation
or merit pay (Lasagna, 2010).
The performance-based perspective has resonated nationally, where recent
initiatives in 40 states have led to the inclusion of merit pay as an alternative or
supplement to the salary and step schedule methods of teacher pay (Lasagna, 2010). In
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Michigan, School Code section 1250 was revised under Public Act 205 of 2010,
requiring that compensation be based on job performance and job accomplishments:
A school district, public school academy, or intermediate school district,
shall implement and maintain a method of compensation for its teachers
and school administrators that includes job performance and job
accomplishments as a significant factor in determining compensation and
additional compensation. The assessment of job performance shall
incorporate a rigorous, transparent, and fair evaluation system that
evaluates a teacher’s or school administrator’s performance at least in part
based upon data on student growth as measured by assessments and other
objective criteria. (PA 205, MCL 380.1250, 2010)
While not specifically eliminating the salary and step schedule, Section 1250 provides a
broad framework requiring districts to examine and alter their compensation methods to
include measures of educator performance.
Subsequent revisions in the school code further strengthened the expectation that
compensation be performance based. In 2011, Public Act 103 revised the Public
Employment Relations Act (PERA), making performance-based compensation under
section 1250 of the revised school code a prohibited subject of bargaining (PA 103, MCL
423.215, 2011). Additionally, Public Act 102 of 2011 revised section 1249 of the school
code whereby personnel decisions will be based on performance as described in board
policy, not tenure or length of service further strengthened the push for performancebased compensation (PA 102, MCL 380.1249, 2011).
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The cumulative impact of the changes to Michigan school code sections 1250,
1249, and 1248 has led to a shift from a collective bargaining-based to policy-based
governance model that requires some form of performance compensation. These
revisions also redistribute authority to superintendents and school boards at the expense
of teacher unions (Canfield-Davis & Jain, 2010). According to the Michigan Association
of School Boards (MASB), these school code changes are “nothing short of monumental”
(MASB, 2011, p. 1).
Purpose
The purpose of this study was to examine the lived experiences of school
superintendents as they attempt to respond to the changes in Michigan’s revised school
code requiring the implementation of a compensation system based upon merit. More
specifically, the overall aims of this study were:
1. To discover how selected superintendents in Michigan school districts understand
and have responded to the requirements of 1250;
2. To uncover the influences and contextual conditions that guided superintendents
as they made decisions in response to 1250;
3. To discern if the influences and contextual conditions are different between those
superintendents that implemented 1250 with those that did not; and finally,
4. To determine if the influences and contextual conditions experienced by the
superintendents in this study differ from those identified by Marsh (2012) and
Rice et al. (2012).
Superintendents are the ideal subjects of this study, as they are at the nexus of
competing contextual pressures. This research sought to determine how these school

3

leaders navigate through these challenges, and equally important, to discern both internal
and external contextual conditions that influenced their decisions and how, and for what
reasons they responded in the fashion they did.
Problem
There is evidence that since the Michigan school code revisions, superintendents
have ignored the requirements for merit pay or have found methods of responding that
have minimally affected prevailing compensation practices in their respective districts
(Van Beek & Spaulding, 2012). It is not understood, however, how and why
superintendents make decisions regarding the school code revisions that give them the
authority and obligation to implement performance-based compensation. This study
sought to provide answers to the above-mentioned questions by providing a more indepth analysis of the experiences of superintendents and the barriers they incurred as it
relates specifically to the administration of section 1250 of the revised school code.
To date, most attention in the field of education has focused on the effects merit
pay programs have on student achievement, or on the sustainability of such compensation
approaches (Clark, 2001; Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Neal, 2008; Podgursky & Springer,
2007). The current literature also has identified challenges associated with designing and
implementing merit pay programs (Marsh, 2012; Rice et al., 2012). Teacher and union
resistance to merit pay has been well documented (Malen, Murphy & Hart, 1987;
Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Rice et al., 2012). What have been overlooked in past research,
however, are the local, strategic decision-making processes and contextual influences
surrounding the implementation (or lack thereof) of merit pay as an educational reform
policy (Marsh, 2012, p. 165).
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To summarize, the focus of this research was on selected superintendents who
were at the juncture of implementing a legislative mandate in complete juxtaposition with
existing and previously held compensation norms and practices in Michigan. Therefore,
the problem this study examined is basically this: How do superintendents in selected
Michigan school districts charged with implementing the merit pay provision expressed
in 1250 negotiate the conflicting pressures and contextual conditions associated with this
required legislative mandate? The section below discusses the specific research questions
of the study.
Research Questions
Overall, this study sought to provide answers to the following overarching
questions: (a) How do superintendents in selected Michigan school districts implement a
new merit pay compensation system required by section 1250; and (b) What contextual
conditions influenced superintendents to make decisions regarding the implementation of
section 1250? To answer these questions, four research questions were proposed:
1. How did superintendents in selected mid-western school districts understand and
respond to the requirements of the school code revision in section 1250?
2. What factors influenced and guided the decisions of superintendents as they
responded to the requirements promulgated by section 1250, and under what
contextual conditions?
3. Were the influences and contextual conditions different between those
superintendents that implemented section 1250 and those that did not?
4. Did the influences and contextual conditions experienced by the superintendents
in this study differ from those identified by Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012)?
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Conceptual Framework
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggested that a conceptual framework serves to
identify who will and will not be included in a study; the relationship between the
subjects and the problem based on logic, theory, and research; and the opportunity to
gather general constructs into intellectual “bins” (p. 18). Based on this definition, the
focus of this study was on the implementation of a set of legislative mandates that require
all school districts to implement unspecified forms of merit pay for teachers in Michigan.
Figure 1 provides a conceptual map showing the anticipated interplay of Michigan’s
merit pay policy requirement and this research:

Figure 1. Merit pay school code revision: Conceptual map.

The conceptual map for this study is divided into four columns. In the first
column, the three legislative changes that created the school code revisions are listed. It
was anticipated that these new policy mandates would produce at least three different
responses from superintendents, which are identified in the second column. These
6

responses include making no changes (i.e., status quo), providing teachers with additional
compensation based on merit without changing the salary and step schedule (i.e.,
egalitarian), and eliminating the salary and step scale for compensation based on
performance (i.e., differentiated). The third column identifies the potential barriers and
challenges these policy provisions encounter based on the research of Marsh (2012) and
Rice et al. (2012). The fourth column describes the subject of this research, which is to
uncover the actual contextual conditions and influences that guide the three types of
superintendents (i.e., status quo, egalitarian, and differentiated).
Methodology
A qualitative phenomenological design methodology was be utilized with a
purposeful sample of nine Michigan public school superintendents. The qualitative
phenomenological approach was chosen as it provides the researcher the ability to
understand “the social and psychological phenomena from the perspectives of the people
involved” (Groenewald, 2004, p. 5). The phenomenological methodology allows the
researcher to:
Understand the world from the subjects’ point of view and to unfold
meaning of peoples’ experiences. At the root of phenomenology is the
intent to understand the phenomena in their own terms and to provide a
description of human experience as it is experienced by the person herself.
(Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 203)
In order to answer the research questions, a purposeful sample of nine
superintendents who represent one of the three outcomes of response to the school code
revisions was identified. Additionally, this study utilized semi-structured interviews with
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the nine superintendents, as well as review of supporting contracts and documents
provided by the subjects.
Procedures
Identification of the purposeful sample of nine superintendents was defined
initially from 2012 Merit Pay Survey conducted by the Mackinac Center (Van Beek &
Spaulding, 2012). In the survey, 114 superintendents responded to queries regarding their
school district implementation of Public Act 205 of 2010, section 1250. It is from this
survey, that a sample of nine subjects was identified.
Information gathered from the interviews was transcribed and analyzed using
coding and pattern analysis techniques in order to develop a cluster of meaning and
themes (Cresswell, 1998; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Miles & Huberman, 1994; Moustakas,
1994). Supporting documentation including related school district policies, district
administrative guidelines, and employee contracts were gathered from the
superintendents. To assess and potentially revise the semi-structured interview questions,
a pilot study was also conducted with a local superintendent who was not part of the
study.
Significance
There is an abundance of research on the effect of merit pay on student
achievement, and the failure of merit pay as an alternative compensation approach for
teachers (Clark, 2001; Dee & Keys, 2004; Figlio & Kenny, 2007; Hanushek, 2003;
Heyburn, Lewis, & Ritter, 2010; Ladd & Clotfelter, 1999; Murnane & Cohen, 1986;
Neal, 2008; Podursky & Springer, 2007; Springer, 2009, 2010, 2012). There is limited
research, however, on local, strategic decision-making processes and contextual
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conditions surrounding the implementation of merit pay as an educational reform tool
(Marsh, 2012; Rice et al., 2012). It is not known why superintendents either implement
merit pay or fail to implement it. Nor is it known what internal and external contextual
conditions drive these decisions when superintendents are given the policy space to enact
such legislatively driven educational reform mandates.
The circumstances in this specific mid-western state concerning the impact of
the shift from a contract-centered governance process to a policy-centered governance
process in the context of the requirement for merit pay have not been researched. This
study is significant in that it attempts to uncover how and why superintendents make
decisions regarding the implementation of merit pay when faced with policy mandates
which run counter to prevailing practice. There is no known study that has examined this
question. This study will provide policymakers and school leaders with a better
understanding of the processes of policy implementation in the face of tensions between
superintendents and prevailing practice. The findings in this study can provide valuable
insight into the implementation of merit pay programs, especially during this early and
formative period of merit pay policy implementation in Michigan.
As Marsh (2012) has stated, “future research is needed on the key decisionmaking processes and outcomes” and that researchers “should seek to identify the
conditions under which educators are more likely to adopt merit pay” (p. 182). This study
also offers an opportunity to confirm Marsh’s (2012) and Rice et al. (2012) claims that
the implementation of merit pay creates five sets of barriers to implementation.
As states and local school districts continue to experiment with merit pay, details
of the implementation of such policy mandates will be increasingly important. Given the
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significant interest and investment in alternative compensation, it behooves policymakers
and educational leaders to better understand the challenges and decision-making
conditions that drive superintendents. It is hoped that this study will contribute to the
literature on merit pay, provide an additional perspective on decision-making processes
used by superintendents, and further influence the policy conversation concerning merit
pay as an educational reform tool at state and local levels.
Delimitations
Creswell (1994) defines delimitations as, “how the study will be narrowed in
scope” (p. 110). Delimitations define the boundaries of the study, including the choice of
objectives, the research questions, the variables of interest, theoretical perspectives, and
the population of the study (Rudestam & Newton, 2001).
In this study, the focus is limited to the implementation of section 1250 of the
Michigan school code, which requires some form of merit pay be provided to teachers as
a form of compensation. The study did not examine the impact of merit pay on student
achievement. It also did not use survey methods to gather data from superintendents.
Instead, semi-structured interviews were used in order to answer the research questions.
As the research questions focus on the experiences of the superintendents, the interviews
provided a “rich description” of the contextual conditions that influenced their decisions
(Yin, 2005).
Limitations
Limitations are the potential weaknesses of the study (Creswell, 1998). In this
study, a number of potential weaknesses can be identified. Phenomenological research,
like all qualitative studies, can be subject to alternative interpretations and have limited

10

transferability (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2003). As Gall et al. (2003) have noted, “the
generalization of knowledge claims beyond the defined population are considered
speculative until supported by evidence from new studies and new populations” (p. 31).
The interview-based protocol used in this study also provides indirect information filtered
through the interviewees. In this situation, the superintendents were interviewed about
events that may have occurred as many as four years ago, affecting accurate recollection
of events and decisions. Interviews by their very nature rely on self-reporting, so the
potential for bias exists (Burns, Gardner, & Meeuwsen, 2009). There may also be some
reluctance to participate in the interviews, as some of the superintendents have chosen to
not implement section 1250.
The coverage of this study was limited to selected mid-western state public school
district superintendents, as they are charged with the implementation of section 1250, and
did not include board of education members, additional members of the administrative
team, union representatives, or teachers. The focus of this study was limited strictly to
superintendents, as this research is interested in uncovering, from the superintendents’
perspective, the contextual and decision-making conditions that influenced how they
responded to the revisions in section 1250.
As an acting superintendent, this researcher had to be aware of his own bias in
regards to 1250, and to ensure that his bias was not communicated with the subjects
during the interview and analysis of data. In addition, utilizing only nine superintendents
also had limitations as the nine chosen may not accurately recall or be able reflect upon
the decisions they made in regards to 1250.
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Summary
With the recent revision of section 1250 of the Michigan school code, school
districts in this mid-western state are now required to implement some form of merit pay.
Superintendents are at the forefront of meeting this policy mandate for their districts.
How they meet (or do not meet) this policy mandate, what contextual influences guide
their decisions, and how and why these decisions differ serve as the central questions of
this study.
This study utilized a qualitative phenomenological approach focused on
interviewing nine superintendents. The results gathered from this study were filtered
through recent merit pay research to identify the similarities and differences between the
subjects in this study and current thinking on merit pay implementation. The aim of this
study is to provide policymakers and school leaders with a better understanding of the
processes of policy implementation in the face of conflicting tensions. Merit pay
represents a significant alternation in compensation practices for school districts, and
undercuts union influence and the collective bargaining process. This research provides
insight into this phenomenon from the perspective of superintendents who are at the
intersection of these conflicting tensions.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter has four sections. The first section traces the origin, rise, and
eventual of decline of teacher union influence in Michigan. The second section reviews
the history of teacher compensation in the United States, with a focus on the dominance
of the salary and step schedule approach. The third section traces the “four waves” of
merit pay reform, introduces the justification of merit pay, and the disparate empirical
evidence of merit pay on student achievement. In the last section, recent research on the
barriers and ongoing challenges when implementing merit pay programs are introduced.
Teacher Unionism in Michigan
Labor unions have been defined as, “private combinations of workingmen” that
attempt to increase wages and improve working conditions for members (Hess & Downs,
2013, p. 2). The tradition of 20th century unionism was largely the work of the American
Federation of Labor (AFL) and its leader Samuel Gompers (Malin, 2009). In Michigan,
the first precursor to a teachers union was the establishment of the Michigan State
Teachers Association in 1852 (Munk, 1998). The first official teachers union in the
United States was not organized until 1897, when the Chicago Teachers Federation was
formed to raise salaries and pensions (Malin, 2009). In 1926, the Michigan State
Teachers Association officially became a teachers union with the establishment of
Michigan Education Association (MEA). It was affiliated with the National Education
Association (Boyd et al., 1998). Shortly thereafter in 1935, the Michigan Federation of
Teachers became a state affiliate of the American Federation of Teachers (Boyd et al.,
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1998). Today, these two unions are the largest single public employee union in the state,
and the third largest in the United States (Malin, 2009).
The rise in teacher labor unions corresponds with the passage of the National
Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), which made it illegal for private employers to
interfere with three areas of employee activities (Hunter, 1999). These areas include: (a)
organization into labor unions, (b) collective bargaining through labor unions, and (c)
activities such as striking and picketing. The NLRA outlawed as unfair labor practices
any employer attempts to interfere or coerce employees engaged in these protected
activities (Heron, 2002). As a result of the NLRA, collective bargaining brought
employers and employees together, forcing both sides to exchange viewpoints and
narrow areas of disagreement. It also strengthened the bargaining position of the
individual employee and removed the unilateral implementation of employer objectives,
replacing it with bilateral discussion (Hunter, 1999).
The NLRA did not address whether the new standards would apply to government
employees and teachers. Opponents to government unions suggested the unions could
threaten public safety because of strikes, the public did not have choice or competition
between providers of service, and that unionism would politicize employees in the public
sector (Malin, 2009). In response to this lack of clarity in the legislation, labor law
regarding public employees was redefined on an individual state level. In 1947, the
Michigan legislature passed Public Act 336, known as the Hutchinson Act (Heron, 2002).
PA 336 of 1947 gave public employees the right to unionize and required mediation of
grievances by a labor mediation board. It also, however, prohibited strikes by public
employees and imposed mandatory penalties on striking employees (PA 336, MCL
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423.201-08, 1947). Under the Hutchinson Act, the penalties for engaging in strike
activity were mandatory, strict, and swift. Any public employee considered on strike
thereby “abandoned and terminated his employment and was no longer entitled to any
rights including pension or retirement rights and benefits” (The Ballenger Report, 2016,
para. 26).
Rise of Teachers Unions (1965 to 1993)
In the 1960s, the Michigan legislature reconsidered the punitive nature of the
Hutchinson Act, and in 1965 decided to amend it. The revised act was called the Public
Employees Relations Act (PERA) of 1965. PERA provided essentially the same rights to
government employees as those protected in the private sector under NLRA. Under
PERA, public employees’ right to join labor unions was strengthened, as well as their
ability to engage in collective bargaining and participate in mediation and fact-finding
procedures under the Michigan Employment Relations Commission or MERC (Hunter,
1999). While still limiting union abilities to incorporate strike procedures, PERA
repealed provisions leading to the termination of striking employees and penalties
associated with such behavior (Hunter, 1999).
From the passage of PERA through the 1990s, teachers unions in Michigan were
among the most powerful in the United States (Boyd et al., 1998). They won rapid and
substantial gains for their members because of their readiness to send teachers on strike,
and they played a dominant role in school and state politics. During this period, teacher
unions won dramatic gains in salaries, benefits, and job security for their members. These
gains were won in large part through the unions’ exploitation of an expanded right to
strike. In addition they leveraged “pattern bargaining” that sought to match gains won in
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one district (often after a strike) with similar gains in neighboring districts (Boyd et al.,
1998).
Between 1967 and 1980, there were 454 teacher strikes against public school
districts in Michigan. This averaged almost 35 per year (Citizens Research Council,
1994). Strikes in the public sector, especially among teachers, were “wielded with full
force” (Hunter, 1999, p. 17). The MEA was also identified as one of the two most
powerful lobbying organizations in Michigan (Inside Michigan Politics, 1993). As Hunter
(1999) noted:
by the beginning of the 1990’s, it was undeniable that MERC, the
Michigan Legislature, and Michigan’s Executive Branch were
increasingly frustrated with teacher unions’ willingness to use strikes as an
economic weapon, regardless of its illegality, in the collective bargaining
process. (p. 25)
Teachers Union Decline (1994 to 2009)
From the1960s until 1993, teachers unions in Michigan were among the most
powerful in the United States (Boyd et al., 1998). The political fortunes in Michigan’s
teachers unions took a decisive turn for the worse in 1990, however, when John Engler
upset James Blanchard to win the gubernatorial election. Engler’s animosity toward the
MEA was one of the abiding principals of his political career (McDiarmid, 1993).
Shortly after assuming the Governor’s office, Engler fulfilled a campaign promise and
put forward a proposal to reduce property taxes and redistribute financial resources in
favor of poorer school districts. The MEA organized the opposition to the Governor’s
“Cut and Cap” plan, which was defeated in a referendum in 1992 (Boyd et al., 1998). In
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1993, the Governor worked with the MEA and put forward a revised plan—the first
Proposal A. Despite nearly universal support from the public school establishment, voters
once again rejected the plan (Boyd et al., 1998). The urgency of property tax reduction
and school finance reform continued, however, and was strengthened when the Kalkaska
school district closed its schools in March 1993 (Plank, 1994). The school board and the
teachers union agreed to close the schools three months early rather than make program
cuts, after local voters declined for the third time to approve an increase in property taxes
to fund school operations. Led by the MEA, educators portrayed the closing of Kalkaska
schools as a signal the state government needed to increase its financial support for public
education. Governor Engler interpreted events differently, arguing that Kalkaska
illustrated the selfish appetite of educators for additional funds and the refusal to consider
measures to restrain costs and put the interests of taxpayers and students ahead of their
own (Plank, 1994).
Soon thereafter, State Senator Debbie Stabenow proposed that property taxes
simply be eliminated as a funding source for public education. Recognizing a political
opportunity, the Republican caucus supported her bill, it was passed, and Governor
Engler signed it (Plank, 1994). In the ensuring debate over how to replace the lost
revenue, the MEA found itself “politically isolated in its advocacy for the restoration of
the status quo” (Boyd et al., 1998, p. 6). A revised Proposal A was put to Michigan voters
in 1994, which shifted the main responsibility for school funding from local property
taxes to the state. Proposal A passed. The changes initiated by Proposal A decisively
altered the education policy environment in Michigan to the disadvantage of teachers
unions (Boyd, 1998).
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Apart from a reduction in property taxes, Proposal A had two main consequences.
First, it banned school districts from raising operational revenues from mileages. As a
result, revenue increases for all Michigan school districts are set in the legislature, which
means, “the bargaining space for local teachers and school boards is very narrowly
constrained” (Boyd et al., 1998, p. 6). Second, Proposal A shifted funding school districts
to students. Districts were now funded by the state based on the number of pupils, not
local revenue captured from property taxes. Governor Engler signaled the strategic
importance of the shift in school finance policy when he signed the bill stating: “the
power and control the teachers’ unions have had over education policies in Michigan
ended this morning” (McDiarmid, 1993, p. 1b).
Shortly after their victory on Proposal A, Republicans in the Michigan Legislature
passed a bill, which directly challenged the power of teacher unions. Known as Public
Act 112 of 1994, the bill (and subsequent law) had three main effects (PA 112, MCL
423.217, 1995). First, it removed a number of significant issues from the bargaining
table, making decisions about these the exclusive prerogative of school boards and not
the collective bargaining process. Specifically, one aspect of PA 112 of 1994 eliminated
the union’s power to veto or require ratification of a collective bargaining agreement
reached between an employer and bargaining unit members. This altered the union’s
ability to maintain consistency in demands between different school districts and
bargaining units throughout the state. Second, in the event that negotiations between
school boards and teachers unions reach an impasse, PA 112 of 1994 allows the school
board to unilaterally impose its “last best offer” without the agreement of the union
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(Boyd et al., 1998). Lastly, PA 112 of 1994 imposed severe penalties on teachers who
strike (Hunter, 1999).
Republicans presented PA 112 of 1994 as a necessary measure to “level the
playing field in collective bargaining,” but to the MEA, it was “a stake through the heart”
(Boyd et al., 1998, p. 8). The Governor sought to cast the MEA as the diehard defender of
a bankrupt status quo, and the MEA obliged by defending the performance of public
schools and lobbying for additional revenues. As Boyd et al. (1998) noted, however,
“Fully absorbed in defending itself and its members against the Governor’s attacks, the
union failed to identify itself with a positive commitment to change, thereby ceding the
reform banner to the Governor” (p. 9).
Overall, as a result of PA 112 of 1994, the power of Michigan teachers unions
was “systematically dismantled,” with additional policy objectives including charter
schools, inter-district choice, and enhancing state-wide testing all adopted despite MEA
objections (Hunter, 1999). Governor Engler presented himself as an “education
governor,” strongly committed to reform and the improvement of Michigan schools
(McDiarmid, 1993). As Mahtesian (1995) has suggested, this political strategy has been
emulated throughout the country:
Engler’s lesson in Michigan – that it is possible to take on the teachers
without committing political suicide – is resonating in other
states…Attacking teachers as a profession is a loser. Confronting teachers
as a labor union, however, can produce political returns by portraying their
opposition to such proposals as school vouchers, charter schools, and
merit pay as nothing more than defense of the status quo. (p. 16)
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Redistribution of Authority (2010 to Present)
In the contest over scarce public resources and the control of work, teachers
unions require some basis upon which to mobilize power and influence. According to
Boyd et al. (1998), support for unions in Michigan has eroded to “the vanishing point” (p.
26). Frontal assaults on teachers unions now make good electoral politics, leading to new
legislation that further weaken their power and collective bargaining. This can be seen
with additional revisions of PERA.
Revisions to PERA stemmed from the federal Race to the Top (RTT) initiative in
2009 (Race to the Top, U.S. Department of Education, 2009). RTT was a state
competitive grant process that “awards states that are leading the way with ambitious, yet
achievable plans for implementing coherent, compelling, and comprehensive education
reform” (Race to the Top, U.S. Department of Education, 2009, p. 2). State applications
were assessed along six domains including one category titled: “Great Teachers and
Leaders.” In this domain, states were awarded points when they “improved teacher and
principal effectiveness based on performance” (p. 3). As part of their response to RTT,
the Michigan legislature amended the section 1250 of its school code by requiring
schools to provide performance pay as defined in Public Act 205 of 2009 (PA 205, MCL
380.1250, 2010).
PA 205 of 2009 was enacted on January 4, 2010, which revised school code
section 1250:
A school district, public school academy, or intermediate school district,
shall implement and maintain a method of compensation for its teachers
and school administrators that includes job performance and job
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accomplishments as a significant factor in determining compensation and
additional compensation. The assessment of job performance shall
incorporate a rigorous, transparent, and fair evaluation system that
evaluates a teacher’s or school administrator’s performance at least in part
based upon data on student growth as measured by assessments and other
objective criteria. (PA 205, MCL 380.1250, 2010)
Section 1250 now requires that upon the expiration of current collective bargaining
agreements, a form of merit pay compensation should be included in a school district’s
salary structure. What makes this school code requirement problematic is that it does not
define what type of merit pay provision districts should adopt, nor does it offer funding to
support merit pay or define how salary and step schedules should be modified.
In 2011, the Michigan Legislature further strengthened management rights at the
expense of union influence and collective bargaining with the passage of Public Act 103.
This act revised the Public Employment Relations Act (PERA) by identifying new
prohibited subjects of bargaining including “performance-based compensation under
section 1250 of the revised school code” (PA 103, MCL 432.215, 2011). This further
eroded collective bargaining by rendering additional topics, which had been “mandatory”
subjects in negotiations to be “prohibited:”
(3) Collective bargaining between a public school employer and a
bargaining representative of its employees shall not include any of the
following subjects: (l) Decisions about the development, content,
standards, procedures, adoption, and implementation of performance
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based compensation under section 1250 of the revised school code.
Section 15,(3), (o). (PA 103, MCL 432.215, 2010)
By making merit pay a prohibited subject of bargaining, this requirement moved
authority away from collective bargaining to administrative policy formation.
The third school code policy revision to change the balance of power between
unions and administration occurred with the passage of Public Act 102 (PA 102) in July
2011, which revised section 1249 of the Michigan school code (PA 102, MCL 380.1249,
2011). PA 102 of 2011 amended section 1249 requiring all teachers to be subject to a
new yearly evaluation system to be developed by the state. In addition, this act requires
teacher effectiveness to be measured, in part, on student effectiveness and growth and
specific performance goals (PA 102, MCL 380.1249, 2011). This provision is an
important variable in the establishment of a performance pay system, as it articulates how
to potentially measure merit.
The cumulative consequence of these three school code revisions has been to
change the balance of power between school administration and the teachers unions.
Clearly, these changes have redistributed authority away from the collective bargaining
process, to one of increasing unilateral authority in the hands of administration.
Salary and Step Schedule
In order to understand the paradigm shift merit pay requires it is important to
understand the history and developments leading to current compensation systems for
teachers. Teacher pay in the United States evolved from rural schools: (a) where
compensation consisted primarily of room and board (1800-1890), (b) to grade-based
salaries tied to the level taught (1890-1920), and (c) to the salary and step schedule first
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implemented in 1921 (Wisconsin Education Council, 2011). These changes reflect the
changing nature of schooling, which grew from small one-room county schools that often
provided only eight years of schooling, to graded systems where children were first
organized by grade levels. Later, highly organized hierarchical K-12 systems were
established for the education of thousands of students (Protsik, 1995). The grade-based
system saw pay that was differentiated based on the gender, race, and grade-level of the
teacher. In Boston in 1896 for example, male high school teachers earned between $1,700
and $4,000 per year, while women earned $2,000 per year maximum (Wisconsin
Education Council, 2011). The rationale for this compensation approach was that
teachers should be paid for the level of skill needed to educate a child at a specific grade
level. It was believed that elementary-age students were easier to educate and less formal
training was required (Protsik, 1995).
At the turn of the 20th century, labor leaders like Samuel Gompers pushed
management for better working conditions and salaries for employees in all professions
(Kerchner, Koppich, & Weeres, 2003). Strikes, boycotts, and negotiations carried out by
the American Federation of Labor (1886) and the Industrial Workers of the World (1905)
were influential in promoting egalitarian pay policies (Podursky & Springer, 2007). As
part of this broader movement, the Chicago Teachers’ Federation called for standardized
pay and improvements in working conditions for teachers in order to reduce gender and
racial inequalities, and nepotism (Podursky & Springer, 2007). These efforts started a
national movement that culminated in 1911 when the city of New York passed a law
requiring equal pay for women. By 1925, over 80 percent of cities in the United States
had equal pay for female teachers (Podursky & Springer, 2007).
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The standardized pay model for teachers was created in 1921when the Des
Moines and Denver public schools first introduced the salary and step schedule that has
come to define teacher compensation today (Kershaw & McKean, 1962). The salary and
step schedule arose in response to charges of racism, gender inequality in pay, and
administrative abuse (Johnson & Papay, 2009). It flourished in mid-20th century,
especially with the rise of powerful teacher unions and collective bargaining in the 1960s
when unions and school boards typically agreed to preserve and strengthen this structure
(Goldhaber & Walch, 2011; Harris, 2008; Johnson & Papay, 2009).
Since its inception, the salary and step schedule has been a nearly constant feature
in teacher compensation. By the 1950s, 97 percent of all public schools had adopted the
single salary schedule (Sharpes, 1987). This figure has remained consistent with
Podursky’s (2007) finding that 96 percent of public schools maintain the salary and step
schedule as a compensation model for teachers based on the 1999-2000 Schools and
Staffing Surveys as seen in Table 1.
Table 1
Teacher Salary Schedules and Merit Pay in Different Types of Schools
Traditional Public a

Charter a

Private a

96.3% (0.29)

62.2% (0.72)

65.9% (1.24)

NBPTS certification?

8.3% (0.37)

11% (0.43)

9.6% (0.88)

Excellence in teaching?

5.5% (0.35)

35.7% (0.65)

21.5% (0.88)

Professional development?

26.4% (0.70)

20.5% (0.56)

18.7% (0.88)

10.4% (0.46)

14.9% (0.54)

7.9% (0.61)

Salary schedule in place
Does the school use merit pay on the
salary schedule based on:

Recruit teachers in fields of
shortage?
Note. a Standard error in parentheses.
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The salary and step schedule is composed of a set of steps that provide each
teacher with an annual raise until they reach the top of the scale, which generally takes
eight to 20 years. In addition to the steps, the scale typically includes three to six “lanes.”
A teacher is entitled to enter a higher paying lane after completing certain academic
credits or degrees. All lanes have the same longevity steps, so a fourth year teacher who
holds a master’s degree in the second lane, earns more than a fourth year teacher who has
no master’s degree and thus remains in the first lane. Once teachers have entered a new
lane, they benefit from the higher pay at each subsequent step of their career. Beyond
remaining on the job, the only way an individual can earn more is dependent on cost-ofliving (COLA) increases negotiated in the collective bargaining agreement, or if they
pursue additional education to enter a new lane (Johnson & Papay, 2009). An example of
a typical salary and step schedule can be seen in Table 2.
The rationale for the almost universal adoption of the salary and step
compensation system for teachers is a result of the previous historical inequities inherent
in original pay methods for teachers, and the rise and influence of teacher unions and
collective bargaining process (Goldhaber & Walch, 2011). When implemented decades
ago, the salary and step model was seen as a way to facilitate the professionalism of
teachers while protecting them from racial and gender discrimination, weak evaluation
systems, and poor administrators. Rewarding experience and educational attainment
through salary increases seemed a logical way to link compensation and potential
contributions (Shields, 2013).
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Table 2
Typical Public School Salary and Step Schedule
Lanes
Step

BA

MA

MA +20

1

$42,271

$44,801

$46,145

2

$44,086

$46,810

$48,217

3

$46,028

$48,923

$50,391

4

$49,334

$52,830

$54,419

5

$51,512

$55,203

$56,858

6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

$53,774
$56,143
$58,607
$61,194
$63,879
$64,708
$65,542
$65,542
$65,542
$66,907
$66,907
$66,907
$66,907
$66,907
$68,289

$57,689
$60,286
$63,004
$65,837
$68,796
$71,892
$73,672
$73,762
$73,762
$75,166
$75,166
$75,166
$75,166
$75,166
$76,650

$59,414
$62,093
$64,885
$67,812
$70,857
$74,047
$75,887
$75,887
$75,887
$77,420
$77,420
$77,420
$77,420
$77,420
$78,948

Note. 2014-2015 Master Agreement between the Harbor Springs Education Association and the Harbor
Springs Public Schools.

Additionally, the salary and step systems allow, according to proponents, teachers
to take pedagogical risks without facing corresponding financial risks. Teachers believe
the salary and step schedule is objective, requires minimal administrative monitoring, and
allows districts to predict anticipated salary outlays with a high degree of accuracy
(Goldhaber & Walch, 2011; Harris, 2008). This system is also easy to understand,
reflects thinking that teachers learn from experience, and allows teachers to have high
expectations for students without worrying that it threatens their income security. Others
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point to the benefit of this model being that it avoids competition between teachers,
which might inhibit collaboration, and it limits the perception that students are barriers to
pay increases (Goldhaber & Walch, 2011). Given the long history of this model, there is
also strong inertia not to change what has been working, while also serving as a tool to
retain experienced teachers (Johnson & Papay, 2009). In addition, institutions of higher
education have benefitted from the ongoing inclusion of a steady pool of teachers
continuing to enroll in educational coursework (Shields, 2013).
Even with the universal adoption of the salary and step model, the annual salary
of teachers in the United States tends to be lower than the annual salary for college
graduates employed in other occupations. Salaries for teachers with 15 years of
experience are, on average, 60 percent or below full-time earnings for 25 to 64-year-olds
with similar education (Shields, 2013). Of the total money a typical district currently
spends on teacher compensation, about 40 percent is spent on starting base salary, 25
percent for teacher longevity, 24 percent on benefits, and 3 percent on additional
responsibilities and additional bonuses (Shields, 2012). Miller and Roza (2012) estimate
states and districts have spent a combined $14 billion to pay for the attainment of
master’s degrees for the 2007-2008 school year, indicating clearly the pervasiveness of
the salary and step schedule.
Merit Pay
Merit pay has been attempted as an educational reform tool on a regular basis
throughout the history of American education. In particular, it has been presented as an
opportunity to bring accountability to teachers, especially in the context of measuring
effectiveness based on student achievement (Podursky, 2007). It has, however, never
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been a sustained alternative model of compensation (Johnson & Papay, 2009; Murnane &
Cohen, 1986). In discussing this, Johnson and Papay (2009) suggest merit pay has
progressed through four successive waves of trial and error. These “waves” tell the story
of merit pay as an educational reform tool.
The first attempt to implement merit pay compensation came following Frederick
Taylor’s “scientific management movement” in the late-19th and early-20th centuries
(Johnson & Papay, 2009). During this first wave, many school districts experimented
with granting salary increases using administrator assessments of individual teachers.
Johnson’s (1984) review of this first wave indicates that these plans were “rife with
administrative abuse” and quickly disappeared to be replaced with salary and step models
(p. 11).
The second wave was influenced by Sputnik, which produced another short-lived
series of merit pay proposals. Teacher unions, however, used their growing influence and
the collective bargaining process to vigorously contest these plans in favor of uniform
compensation and treatment by administrators (Shields, 2012). During the 1960s,
approximately 10 percent of school districts had merit pay plans. By 1978, these plans
dropped to 3 percent, with the majority of merit pay plans lasting less than five years
(Murnane & Cohen, 1986).
The third wave started with the publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983, which
gave rise to the accountability movement and a corresponding shift toward economic
values as a measure of the effectiveness of schools (Johnson & Papay, 2009). The
argument was that public schools had failed, with business and political leaders calling
for a wide-ranging package of reforms including choice, testing, merit pay, and standards.
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The reforms have been described as redistributive politics whose “politics are
controversial and are marked by conflict…the attitudes and discourse of the participants
in this arena are deeply ideological” (Lowi, 1964, p. 707). Such proposals have created an
ideological conflict that is still playing out today. As Iannaccone (1988) suggests, such
ideological conflicts are “not completely consistent with reality…the adherents of an
ideology accept its major tenets without question and react emotionally rather than
rationally when someone challenges them” (p. 122).
From the early-1980s until the mid-1990s, a host of individual school districts
experimented with merit pay. Most districts during this time did not replace the salary
and step schedule, but used bonuses to individuals, groups of teachers, or schools on a
number of factors including student achievement, observations, and teacher portfolio
(Burns et. al, 2009). Such merit pay models again came under attack by teacher unions
and research that indicated that the reliability and validity of the teacher evaluation tools
were suspect, where tying student performance to individual or groups of teachers
“created a make-believe system of cause and effect” (Podursky & Springer, 2007, p. 94).
Critics during the third wave of merit pay programs also suggested these programs lacked
transparency, were based on cursory evaluations, and created a system where in many
cases teachers did not know what they needed to do to achieve the bonus (Johnson &
Papay, 2009). None of the third wave merit pay programs are still in existence, but they
provided lessons that play a role in the design and implementation of contemporary merit
pay programs.
The fourth and current wave of merit pay programs has been driven by a host
federal and state legislative requirements, as well as independent stakeholders intent on
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transforming teacher compensation (Johnson & Papay, 2009). The first of the
contemporary merit pay systems have their roots in the 1999 Denver Public Schools
ProComp model, which linked pay to student achievement and professional evaluations
(Podursky & Springer, 2007). Denver’s ProComp represents the most high profile and
sustainable merit pay system. With the support of the local teachers union, a pilot
program was initiated with the goal to increase student achievement and attract and retain
highly effective teachers. The program gained support, and in 2004, union members
ratified a proposal for a more comprehensive program. In 2005, Denver voters approved
a tax hike to provide funding for $25 million to sustain the program (Goldhaber & Walch,
2011). Under this hybrid plan the existing salary and step model was retained but reduced
with additional bonus money tied to teacher evaluation, incentives for hard-to-serve
schools and hard-to-staff assignments, and measures of student growth (Goldhaber &
Walch, 2011).
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 (NCLB) further propelled interest in merit
pay. NCLB emphasized increasing regulation and accountability for improving student
achievement, as well as the use of charter schools to replace public schools with a history
of low student performance (Johnson & Papay, 2009). In addition, William Saunder’s
work in developing Tennessee’s Value Added and Assessment System (TVAAS) created
a model for calculating and attributing student achievement to individual teachers,
potentially isolating the value a teacher adds to student performance (Burns et al., 2009;
Podursky & Springer, 2007). This advanced measurement process represented a step
forward and a shift from input measures (e.g., longevity and coursework) to new output
measures such as student achievement (Burns et al., 2009). The value-added approach is
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a way of isolating the contribution of individual teachers and schools on increasing
student achievement when controlling for other external influences such as student and
family characteristics. While seen as a preferable model of measuring student
performance based strictly on results of proficiency tests, this complicated statistical
process requires a tremendous amount of support from statisticians and educational
research institutions (Heyburn, 2010).
The federal government contributed to the rise in merit pay programs in 2006
with an appropriation of $99 million to the U.S. Department of Education (Podursky &
Springer, 2007). The purpose of this funding was to develop and implement merit pay
programs. Called the Teacher Incentive Fund, or TIF, the intiative spurned a host of state
and local school district pilot programs utilizing seed money from the grants to fund
bonus systems (Podursky & Springer, 2007). Eventually, an additional $400 million in
funding was allocated to TIF through 2010 (Heyburn, 2010). TIF grants led to prominent
state initiatives in Texas starting in 2006, Minnesota in 2006, and Florida in 2007
(Podursky & Springer, 2007).
One example of these state TIF initiatives includes Governor Rick Perry and the
Texas legislature’s crafting the Governors Educator Excellence Award Program in 2006.
This initiative provided $330 million to high performing, high poverty public schools
(Podursky & Springer, 2007). In Minnesota, the legislature approved Q-Comp, a merit
pay program that incorporates a traditional salary and step schedule, professional
development expectations, and student achievement measures. Based on end-of-year
student performance results, public school districts in Minnesota were awarded up to an
additional $260 per student (Podursky & Springer, 2007). And finally, in 2007 Florida
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established, the Special Teachers are Rewarded Program with allocations of $147
million. Bonus systems of 5 to 10 percent of average district salaries were awarded to a
minimum of 25 percent of teachers. The bonus was based on student performance,
teacher evaluation, and “any other factor determined by the school board” (Neal, 2008, p.
2). Typically these merit pay systems were “pilot models,” designed to be evaluated prior
to full implementation.
A major boost that spurred the recent development of merit pay systems was the
federal Race to the Top (RTT) education contest designed to encourage innovation and
reform. The U.S. Department of Education allocated $4.35 billion as part of American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (U.S. Department of Education, 2009). States
were awarded points for satisfying certain educational policies including “performance
based standards for teachers and principals” (U.S. Department of Education, 2009).
President Obama support for RTT included a desire to improve schools by reforming
state accountability systems, national standards, technology systems and teacher
compensation. In a speech on March 10, 2009, President Obama stated: “It is time to start
rewarding good teachers and stop making excuses for bad ones…success should be
measured by results which is why any state that makes it unlawful to link student
progress to teacher evaluation will have to change its ways” (Johnson & Popay, 2009, p.
1).
The Consortium for Policy Research in Education at the University of Wisconsin
in 2012, has documented the range and far-reaching impact of new merit pay programs.
This Consortium released a “national map” showing only ten states not having educator
compensation reform initiatives in place. In Figure 2, the map is attached.
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Figure 2. National map of states with educator compensation reform initiatives. Source:
Consortium for Policy Research in Education. (2012). Teacher compensation research.
Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin.
Additional leverage and funding for educator compensation reform came also
from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation when it announced in 2009 that it was
phasing out its large investment in small high schools, and instead turning its attention
toward teacher quality (Johnson & Popay, 2009). The foundation planned on spending
nearly $700 million on what they describe as a teacher quality agenda that included
grants and research into creating powerful value-added tools to measure the impact of
teacher influence on achievement, the alteration of current compensation practices, and
the development of better teacher evaluation assessments (Sawchuk, 2013).
Table 3 presents a summary of these key models, which define the vast
differences in funding sources, expectations for scope, inclusion of teacher evaluation
tools and student achievement measures, and impact on transforming the salary and step
model of compensation.
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Table 3
“Fourth Wave” Merit Pay Programs
Funding
Source

Teacher
Evaluation
Based

Student
Achievement
Based

Change
Salary
Schedule

Financial
Award

ProComp,
1999, Denver
Public Schools

Local levy, $22
million

Yes: Requires
satisfactory
evaluation

Yes: Based on
Colorado state
assessment

Adds to salary
schedule

School gets 3%
and individual
up to 3%

TAP, 1999,
Milken Family
Foundation

Private grant
w/ additional
federal funds

Yes: Career
pathways TAP
tool

Yes: Teachers
set learning
goals

Bonus

Individual
$5,000 to
$11,000

Q-Comp, 2005,
Minnesota
Dept. of
Education

State, $86
million

Yes: State tool

Yes: State test

Bonus

District award
up to $260 per
student

Federal
competitive
grants, $99
million

Yes: Unique to
each setting

Yes: Unique to
each setting

Unique to each
setting

Unique to each
setting

State grants to
130 low
achieving
schools, $10
million

Yes

Yes: State text

Replace
schedule

75% to teacher
and 25% to
school

State grants to
low achieving
schools

No

Yes: State test

Bonus

Individual
bonus up to 5%
of salary

No

Yes: Stanford
Achievement
Growth
Assessment

Bonus

Teacher bonus
from $2,500 to
$5,000

TIF, 2006,
U.S. Dept. of
Education
GEEG, 2006,
Texas
Governors
Excellence
Award
STAR
2006 Florida
Special
Teachers
Rewarded
Mission
Possible, 2006,
Guilford Public
Schools, NC

State grants, $8
million

DATE, 2007,
Texas District
Award for
Teacher
Excellence

State grants,
$230 million

No

Yes: State test

Bonus

School and
teachers share
up to $20 per
student

MAP, 2009
Florida Merit
Award

State grants

Yes: State
evaluation tool

Yes: State test,
growth model

Replace

Amount
determined
locally
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Table 3—Continued
Funding
Source

Teacher
Evaluation
Based

Student
Achievement
Based

Change
Salary
Schedule

Financial
Award

To school,
percent
District grant
No
No: bonus
increase
application
determined by
staff
Source: Consortium for Policy Research in Education. (2012). Teacher compensation research. Madison,
WI: University of Wisconsin.
SPBP
2010 NYC
Public Schools

School outcome
compared to
other schools

Justification for Merit Pay
During the fourth wave of interest in merit pay programs, business and
conservative groups have called for the transformation of public education into a
competitive marketplace in which school leaders need to become marketing experts
(Knoester, 2010). This agenda calls for the deregulation of public education through such
policies as privatization, choice, accountability, and metrics. Neo-liberals, including
Presidents Obama and Clinton, have staked out the middle ground by supporting state
and national intervention, national standards, testing, and teacher accountability
(Knoester, 2010).
The confluence of the conservative and neo-liberal ideology has created what
Henig (2009) described as an “erosion of boundaries” and the “end of educational
exceptionalism,” where the loss of local control is replaced by policy requirements
mandated at the national and state levels (p. 296). There has been a steady erosion of
local control and the traditional separation between education as a “special government”
and larger state interests. The march is towards new institutional forms and requirements,
with the status quo, especially unions and collective bargaining, becoming structurally
weaker (Malin, 2009).
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This new coalition of policymakers who espouse conservative and neo-liberal
ideology is based on schools becoming the vehicles of economic improvement and
individual empowerment (Henig, 2009). The focus of this movement is on a combination
of regulatory capacity building and system changing reform efforts based on market
solutions such as efficiency, growth, and quality. These economic values have been
translated into education policies that favor accountability, achievement, competition, and
the use of “metrics” (Fowler, 2009; Henig, 2009; Muth, 1984; Timar & Kirp, 1987).
Business conservatives believe that human beings are motivated by self-interest,
primarily economic interests. In their view, if people can pursue their individual interests
by competing freely in the marketplace, then system change can occur as a result of
competition (Chubb & Moe, 1990).
Critics of current teacher compensation systems also point to a growing body of
research that indicates rewarding teachers for longevity and accumulated course credits is
not well-aligned with the outcomes of schooling (Goldhaber, 2002; Hanushek, 1992,
2003; Heyburn, 2010; OCED, 2009; Sanders, 2005; Sanders & Horn, 1994). The quality
of a child’s teacher is recognized as one of the most important factors bearing on student
achievement, and the “quality” of a teacher is not utilized in the salary/step compensation
method (Hanushek, 1992, 2003; Saunders, 2005; Rivkin et. al. 2005). According to
Hanushek (1992, 2003), teacher quality can account for more than a full-grade level
equivalent on a standardized achievement test. Hanushek (2003) further postulated that
only 3% of the contribution teachers make to student learning can be associated with
teacher experience, degrees attained, and other observable characteristics. Goldhaber
(2002) also asserted that the impact of teacher quality is larger than any other schooling
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input on student performance. William Sanders’ (2005) work in developing the
Tennessee’s Value-Added and Assessment system provides additional evidence that large
variations exist in achievement gain scores between classrooms and teachers. His
findings suggest that teachers can have a substantial effect on student achievement
growth.
Additional support for merit pay stems from the relatively poor performance of
U.S. students on international math and science tests, along with the rapid rise of the state
and national standards movement (Burns, Gardner, & Meeuwsen, 2009). Improving and
rewarding teacher quality, leading to improved student achievement, is suggested by
proponents as an outgrowth of merit pay programs (Heyburn, 2010; Springer, 2009).
Merit pay systems are also increasingly tied to teacher evaluation protocols,
which may provide the technical supports necessary to identify and reward teacher
effectiveness. By the mid 1970s, researchers concluded that principal evaluations could
be a reliable guide to identifying high and low performing teachers as measured by
student test score gains (Armor et al., 1976; Murnane, 1975). More recently, Sanders and
Horn (1994) demonstrated that there is a strong correlation between teacher effects and
subjective evaluations by principals. In a study focused on the predictive validity of
supervisor evaluations, Jacob and Lefgren (2005) assessed the relationship between
teacher performance ratings from principal evaluations and teacher effects as measured
by student achievement gains. Their findings demonstrate “statistically significant and
positive relationship between value-added measures of teacher productivity and
principals evaluations of teacher” (p. 78).
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Many proponents of merit pay systems see the new compensation systems as a
way to reduce the influence of teacher unions and the collective bargaining process, as
they see these as a root cause in protecting bad teachers and stifling reform (Kochan,
2011; Malin, 2009; Moe, 2006; Munk, 1998; Strom & Baxter, 2001; Young, 2011).
Malin (2009) suggested that collective bargaining “has channeled public employees away
from investing in the risks of public enterprise, towards isolating their members from
those risks” (p. 139). Other pundits go further by stating, “collective bargaining is taking
public education in an unsustainable direction with teachers unions as guardians of a
failed status quo” (Fuller & Mitchell, 2006, p. 1380).
Impact of Merit Pay on Student Achievement
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of merit pay on student achievement is
slender, with conflicting results. Podgursky and Springer (2012) reviewed the range of
major merit pay research projects found a diversity of results. Table 4 summarizes these
studies.
Table 4
Empirical Evidence of Merit Pay on Student Achievement
Study

Sample

Incentive

Outcome Variable

Results

Ladd, Clotfelter
(1999)

Dallas, 7th-grade,
achievement
compared to other
urban districts

School

Math and reading
test scores

Positive

Dee & Keys
(2004)

STAR Tennessee,
career ladder
evaluation system,
K- 3rd-grade,
11,600 students,
random
assignments

Teacher

Math and reading
scores, Stanford
Achievement Test

Mixed, 3%
increase in math
scores, no change
in reading
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Table 4—Continued
Study

Sample

Incentive

Outcome Variable

Results

Figlio & Kenny
(2006)

NELS 88, matched
to 93-94 SASS
12th-grade

Teacher

Test scores in
reading, math and
science

Positive

Winters et al.
(2006)

Arkansas, 5th-grade

Teacher

Test scores in math

Positive

Springer et al.
(2010)

POINT, Nashville,
middle schools,
controlled
experiment,
random assignment

Teacher

Test scores in math

Negative

Marsh (2012)

NYC, at-risk
schools volunteer
to participate,
compared to other
at-risk schools in
district

School

School-based
outcome targets

Negative

Springer et al.
(2012)

Round Rock
Texas, middle
schools, control
groups

Team

Test scores in math
and reading

Negative

Source: Consortium for Policy Research in Education. (2012). Teacher compensation research. Madison,
WI: University of Wisconsin.

A positive impact of merit pay programs on increasing student achievement can
be found in three studies. In the first study, Ladd and Clotfelter (1999) examined the
effect of school-wide merit pay implemented in the Dallas Public Schools. The authors
found that achievement rose relative to other Texas public school districts (Podursky &
Springer, 2007). In the second study, which found student achievement gains, Figlio and
Kenny (2007) analyzed data from a national sample of K-12 schools. In their research,
Figlio and Kenny (2007) attempted to estimate the effect of merit pay by comparing the
academic performance of schools with various types of incentive programs to those
schools that did not have merit pay programs. Findings in this study suggested that both
public and private schools that received modest doses of merit pay scored statistically
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higher than those schools that did not have merit pay programs for teachers. In a much
smaller but more robust research study, Winters, Ritter, Barnett, and Green (2006)
compared the achievement scores of two schools participating in Little Rock, Arkansas’
Achievement Challenge Pilot Project (ACP) with three other elementary schools that did
not participate in the program, but had similar demographic and academic characteristics.
When comparing student proficiency in mathematics, the researchers found students
participating in the pilot program exhibited statistically significant improvements in
mathematics (4.6 NCE points) for every year they attended the ACP school in
comparison to their corresponding counterparts in non-ACP schools (Winters et al.,
2006).
In contrast to the above studies, which found positive achievement gains, at least
four empirical studies have found mixed or negative results. In the first, Dee and Keys
(2004) examined student achievement results from Tennessee’s former merit-pay plan
(Career Ladder Evaluation System, CLES) and the well-known class-size experiment,
Project STAR. They determined that assignment to career ladder teachers significantly
increased mathematics scores based on the Stanford Achievement Test by roughly 3
percentile points in 1st through 3rd-grade. However, these teachers were not significantly
more effective at promoting reading achievement as compared to other teachers on a
lower teacher scale (Dee & Keys, 2004).
Springer (2010) conducted a 3-year study in the Nashville Public Schools
concerning the effect of financial rewards to teachers and its eventual impact on students.
In this study, Podursky and Springer (2007) concluded, the “students of teachers
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randomly assigned to the treatment group (eligible for bonuses), did not outperform
students whose teachers were assigned to the control group” (p. 10).
From 2006 to 2010, the New York City Public Schools instituted the Schoolwide
Performance Bonus Program (SPBP) for the purpose of improving the academic
performance of its students. In this study, 200 high-needs schools established student
achievement performance targets and measured growth on standardized tests and relative
performance compared to other similar schools not participating in the SPBP program in
New York City. During the length of the program, over $50 million in bonuses were paid
to schools. The district formally discontinued the program in 2011; however, because the
researchers from RAND were not able to find any statistically significant achievement
gains on standardized tests for students in any grade levels in reading or math in the
SPBP program versus the control schools (Marsh, 2012). As Marsh (2012) concluded,
“This study indicated no or negative differences between the outcomes of students
attending schools randomly assigned to be in programs vs. control groups…merit pay
bonuses offer only weak incentives” (p. 368).
In 2008, the National Center on Performance Incentives (NCPI) conducted two 1year randomized controlled trials to study the impact of team-level merit pay for middle
school teachers in four core content subject areas in the Round Rock Independent School
District in the State of Texas. In this study, 78 middle school teams of teachers were
randomly assigned to the treatment (eligible for an award) or control condition (not
eligible for an award). If a treatments team’s value-added score was among the highest
one-third among treatment teams in each grade level, teachers on the team were awarded
$5,400 each. To evaluate the effects of the bonus program on student outcomes, the study
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used both the Texas Assessment of Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) and the Stanford
Achievement Test. Analysis of student achievement outcomes revealed that there was
“no overall intervention effect in any subject area across the two years of the experiment”
(p. 379).
Empirical studies that have examined merit pay systems as a method for
improving student achievement are mixed. Neal (2008) concluded that there is no
evidence to support the claim that merit pay conclusively serves as a vehicle for
improving student achievement. In this regard, Neal (2008) further concluded that the
research on merit pay is not conclusive as studies have “…contradictory findings, issues
with breadth of assessments, reliability of assessments, the alignment of assessments with
curriculum, and the potential for schools to manipulate data” (p. 1). These issues hamper
conclusive evidence to support the claim that merit pay will serve as a vehicle for
addressing the longstanding issues of improving student achievement.
Barriers to Merit Pay Implementation
Opposition to merit pay is based on liberal ideology, which has its core an
emphasis on fairness, social justice, and equality (Fowler, 2009). These core values have
guided policy and practice in public schools for decades (Burns, Gardner, & Meeuwsen,
2009; Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Neal, 2008). This ideology represents the interests of
teachers unions, and have until recently been the dominant paradigm and status quo.
Merit pay is viewed as an anathema to this ideology, as it represents a loss of union
influence, threatens collective bargaining, and fosters competition instead of professional
collaboration.
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Murnane and Cohen’s (1986) article in the Harvard Education Review provided,
until recently, the most comprehensive examination of the failures of merit pay reform
programs. In this seminal review, Murnane and Cohen (1986) documented key issues that
had doomed merit pay up until that point. These issues included the lack of merit pay to
motivate teachers, resistance to changing the salary and step schedule, problems with
determining pay based on test scores, concerns over reducing teacher collaboration, and
the lack of effective teacher evaluation systems. According to Murnane and Cohen
(1986):
The data indicates that low morale and problems of administration are the
primary reasons school districts drop merit pay. Management’s perception
that the positive impact of bonuses on the performance of superstars
would be more than offset by negative effects on the performance of
effective teachers who do not receive bonuses, do not know why they
were passed over, and cannot be told how to become superstars. (p. 10)
In more recent times, two studies have updated Murnane and Cohen’s (1986)
work on the barriers to merit pay. In the first, Rice et al. (2012) identified the four sets of
issues that arose in Prince George’s County Maryland merit pay program, which have
also been chronicled in other merit pay programs. Rice et al.’s (2012) work is particularly
useful, as they conducted a comprehensive literature review of merit pay barriers to
implementation. In addition, Marsh (2012) identified a fifth critical barrier to merit pay
implementation. The challenges they identified include:
1. Securing and maintaining stakeholder support.
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2. Developing and implementing accurate and credible measures of educator
performance.
3. Developing the district capacity required to implement and sustain the initiative.
4. Aligning the reform with district goals and culture of the work environment.
5. Administrator conflict avoidance.
Stakeholder Support
The first challenge identified by Rice et al. (2012) suggests that securing and
maintaining stakeholder buy-in is critical and contingent on the features of the merit pay
program. These features include the opportunity to participate in program design,
attainability of the award, and the perceived transparency and fairness of the program
(Rice et al., 2012). Even well conceived and collaboratively developed initiatives may
not be able to sustain support if those responsible are not given time to plan and develop
the plan (Honig, 2009; McLaughlin, 1987). As Locke and Latham (2002) suggested,
people usually try to do what is asked of them (p. 707). If a policy is unclear or vague,
however, the “people to be regulated do not know what they are supposed to do, [and]
they cannot do it” (Simon et al., 1950, p. 415). Furthermore, as Cohen, Moffit, and
Goldin (2007) noted, the more general an idea, the “more adaptable it is to a range of
circumstances, the more likely it is to be realized in some form, but less likely to emerge
as intended” (p. 532). Policy specificity or definition improves performance by reducing
ambiguity about what is to be attained (Locke & Latham, 2002). Locke and Latham
(1990) demonstrated that specific goals increase overall goal attainment and performance
with effect sizes in meta-analyses ranging from .42 to .80 (p. 29).
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The legitimacy of the policy (such as section 1250) and of the authority is also a
key determinant of goal accomplishment (Locke, Latham, & Erez, 1988, p. 30).
According to Locke et al. (1988), the source of authority does not reside in the superior,
the legislature, or the school code, but in the acceptance of the authority by subordinates
(p. 30). Perceptions of trust are an important dimension, as perceptions of trust are
significantly related to accomplishing difficult goals and in the acceptance of authority
(p. 27). Barnard (1938) provided further insight into the impact of policy legitimacy
when he stated that subordinates will implement a goal when they understand the order,
they believe the order is consistent with organizational objectives, and they are “mentally
able” to comply with the objective (Locke et al., 1988, p. 33). Banard (1938) coined the
concept zone of indifference wherein a person will accept order without question (p. 33).
If obeying the order results in a “negative balance,” then the person will no longer
comply with authority (p. 33). Policy reform that is mandated and judged as coercive can
lead to conflict, and conflict can lead to less commitment and implementation
(McDonnell & Elmore, 1987). The unintended results of a new policy such as PA 205, is
that it may not “break through the barriers” of the status quo (p. 134).
In research on assigned versus participative goal setting, Locke et al. (1988) found
that assigned goals lower effectiveness and reduce performance (p. 32). They described
the “tell method” of setting goals (or determining policy) as leading to lower goal
commitment and “hence lower performance” (p. 32). The impact of participation has
been widely understood since Lewin’s work (1947, 1952) on group decision experiments
uncovered the positive impact of group consensus in improving performance. Policy
ideas have great difficulty in penetrating and changing the status quo if key actors do not
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perceive themselves as having a stake in the decision-making process or outcomes. Dryer
(1999) described this as a “lack of ownership of the innovation” (p. 59). Muth (1984)
perhaps described the impact of lack of ownership best when he suggested, “coercion
leads to conflict, alienation, and less effectiveness…the greater the influence the more
consensus, commitment, and effectiveness” (p. 36).
Finally, Knapp (1997) described the importance of participatory conditions as
leading to implementation, stating the “implementers at the lowest level are policy
brokers leading to mutual adaptation” (p. 251). Furthermore, Berman and McLaughlin
(1978) state that successful implementation was not a “mechanical process of following
recipes from a policy cookbook, but rather a process of mutual adaptation modified to fit
local circumstances” (p. 274).
Evaluation Procedures
The second set of challenges identified by Rice et al. (2012) suggest that it is
difficult to effectively measure teacher performance and student growth. Research
suggests that teacher evaluations occur infrequently, tend to be superficial, and rarely
promote professional growth or measure student performance (Portin, Feldman, &
Knapp, 2006). Traditional teacher evaluations have been critiqued for their subjective
nature (Murnane & Cohen, 1986). Though “standards-based teacher evaluations” may
enhance objectivity by delineating key criteria for determining teacher excellence, these
evaluation systems require substantial resources including time for staff training and
implementation (Portin et al., 2006).
The use of student outcomes to measure teacher effectiveness is arguably more
objective than reliance on teacher evaluations, but this approach is problematic on a
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number of counts. For instance, student outcome data tend to focus on a narrow set of
educational goals such as math and reading achievement (Rice et al., 2012).
Furthermore, estimates of effectiveness based on achievement tests may be biased as a
result of demographic characteristics of students, nonrandom assignment of students to
teachers, potential incomparability of gains across grades, and student mobility (Rice et
al., 2012, p. 897). Critics also claim that the lack of appropriate teacher evaluation tools
lead to a host of issues including teaching to the test, the inability to measure the impact
of teacher performance for non-core teachers (such as art, physical education, foreign
language and music), and the reduction of collaboration between teachers as they
compete for monetary awards (Neal, 2008; Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Burns et al., 2009).
In addition, they point to the lack of trained evaluators that can accurately measure and
evaluate teaching, and the absence of student assessment tools that can measure student
growth (Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Hanushek, 2003; Johnson, 1984; Rice et al., 2012).
Opponents of merit pay suggest that without fair measures that link teacher
effectiveness and student growth, merit pay has little chance of being implemented with
fidelity. As Burns et al. (2009) reported, “teacher worry that evaluations will not be fair is
the most common concern regarding merit pay” (p. 41). Research indicates that low
morale and problems of teacher evaluation have been the primary reasons schools have
dropped merit pay (Murnane & Cohen, 1986). Neal (2008) went one step further when he
described what has been termed Campbell’s Law:
I come to the following pessimistic law. The more any quantitative social
indicator is used for social decision making, the more subject it will be to
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corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort and corrupt the
social processes it is intended to monitor. (p. 1)
Sustainability
The third set of issues Rice et al. (2012) identified is the inability of districts to
sustain merit pay programs. The research on the longevity of merit pay systems is not
promising. In the 1960s, approximately 10% of schools had merit pay plans, but this
number dropped to 3% by 1978, which is where it stands today (Porwoll, 1979; Burns et
al., 2009). Moreover, the majority of districts that have tried and dropped merit pay did
so within five years of its adoption (Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Marsh, 2012). The data
regarding the lack of sustainability of merit pay programs is startling considering the state
and federal dollars that have been expended, and the large number of state and local
policy initiatives promoting merit pay initiatives. One of the key challenges is that merit
pay programs have proven expensive. For example, all of the most well-known merit pay
programs such as the Denver ProComp plan, the Dallas Educators’ Excellence Grants,
and the Minnesota Q Comp plan rely on local tax increases or state and federal grants to
support increased spending on teacher salaries (Rice et al., 2012). As teacher unions are
unwilling to alter the traditional salary and step schedule, additional resources are often
required to fund merit pay programs.
Cohen et al. (2007) suggested that “ambitious” policy changes that substantially
change existing practices (such as merit pay) require high levels of support. Specifically,
these authors argued, “Ambitious aims require big resources and good supports,
otherwise they will be unsuccessful” (Cohen et al., 2007, p. 514). Other authors such as
Coburn and Stein (2006) suggested that policymakers should not only define the change
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required, “they should also provide the infrastructure necessary to learn collectively how
to implement the changes” (p. 280). School districts must have the capacity to evaluate
teacher performance and to serve as instructional leaders. These resources demand time,
effort, and expertise that districts may not possess. In order for merit pay to work,
districts must have the capacity to provide an infrastructure that can accommodate the
data requirements and managerial demands of the initiative (Azordegan et al., 2005).
Culture
The last barrier identified by Rice et al (2012) is that the purpose of merit pay
programs must be consistent with district goals and culture. Sarason (1996) offered the
opinion that institutional and individual change is difficult, as “most education reforms
fail because reformers do not take school culture into account” (p. 272). Policy ideas
seem to have great difficulty in penetrating the status quo because of the lack of fit
between the intended policy outcomes and the culture embedded within the school and
those leading the institutions. The more policies depart from conventional practice and
culture, the more incompetence they create, and thus, the more capability they require of
practitioners (Cohen et al., 2007). Cohen et al. (2007) further described this as the policy
dilemma stating, “policies aim to solve problems, yet the key problem solvers are those
that have the problem” (p. 515). The problem solvers are guided by culture and ideology,
which Fowler (2009) defined as a fairly coherent set of values and beliefs about the way
things should be (p. 5). When that culture is threatened, Ianaccone (1991) suggested that
its adherents might react emotionally rather than rationally when someone challenges
them (p. 467).
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Historically, schools appear to be highly durable organizations that have been able
to accommodate almost any change without fundamentally changing the status quo
(Timar & Kirp, 1987). Since the goal of merit pay programs is often to change the
behaviors of individuals so that they conform to new expectations, such expectations
often underestimate the complexities of cultural and ideological norms, and overestimate
the capacity of the decision-makers to change it. As Timar and Kirp (1987) suggested,
“the unhappy truth is when successful implementation of policy depends on changing the
culture of schools, failure can often be anticipated” (p. 311). Fullan (2005) wrote
extensively on this subject and summarized the “nonlinear nature of educational change”
by advising change and policy agents to:
not assume that your version of what the change should be is the one that
should or could be implemented. On the contrary, assume that one of the
main purposes of the process of implementation is to exchange your
reality of what should be to what eventually occurs. (p. 288)
Paris (1998) also summarized the challenges of alternative policy realities in
institutional school reform implementation when he said:
What changes have occurred have not, in either scale or substance, been
what reformers had in mind. In many instances, schools have largely
absorbed reform efforts by folding them into existing patterns and
practices. Rather than reforms changing the schools, the schools have
changed the reforms or created their own. The process of real change in
schools often works from the inside-out. (p. 389)
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Making changes policymakers mandate requires learning on the part of the enactors
(Berman, 1982). Such learning is complicated further when the enactors are required to
unlearn, or give up common practices and ways of thinking. In a sense then, new policies
can create incompetence (p. 520). Furthermore, Cohen et al. (2007) argued, “ambitious
policies require practitioners to acquire new capabilities and to unlearn present
capabilities…they create more incompetence” (p. 522).
Merit pay programs, according to Lawler (1990), should be designed to reinforce
the objectives of organizations and “fit the organization’s culture, management style, and
strategy ” (p. 11). When pay systems are not aligned with key features of the work
environment, their impact may be “neutralized or negated by the numerous forces that
interact to influence the performance and satisfaction of the people in the organization”
(Malen et al., 1987, p. 93). For example, while school goals emphasize improving
achievement for all students, merit pay may prompt teachers to work primarily with high
ability and high achieving students. If the goal is to develop collaborative learning
communities, merit pay systems may undercut that aim. The perception also exists that
merit pay systems will change the collaborative culture in schools, which is so necessary
to leverage the talents, skills and idea of the team (Marsh, 2012). If teachers’ pay is based
on raising test scores, there are strong incentives for teachers to keep their “best
practices” for influencing student achievement private.
Conflict Avoidance
In her examination of the failure of New York City Public Schools’ merit pay
program, Marsh (2012) identified an additional barrier to success. Her key finding was
that the avoidance of conflict and friction came at the expense of the implementation of

51

the policy. Marsh (2012) uncovered during her research that “administrators view their
role as system maintenance with conflict avoidance as the pervasive norm” (p. 179). Only
in rare circumstances when powerful administrative change agents existed did merit pay
gain a foothold in New York City Public Schools. Marsh (2012) described these change
agents as those that “embraced merit pay and the potential conflicts resulting from it as a
means to motivate and reward performance and catalyze change” (p. 179). The prevailing
culture and ideology of schools has been defined by as “loosely coupled” by Smith
(2008), with a “strong tendency to avoid conflict” (Marsh, 2012, p. 180). These deeply
engrained norms run counter to the market-based values of meritocracy upon which merit
pay is based. These norms have mediated the efforts of past merit pay initiatives, as this
normative conflict “strikes a particularly hard blow at the egalitarian ethos of the
profession” (p. 181).
Conflict serves as a change function, giving individuals and groups an opportunity
to impact outcomes (Achinstein, 2002). As a new policy requires change, Achinstein
(2002) suggested that change will lead to conflict, but this conflict can be positive;
“conflict it turns out, offers a context for inquiry, organizational learning, and
change…conflict becomes constructive for the community and school” (p. 340). Too
much conflict is debilitating and can adversely influence performance (Locke & Latham,
1988). Lowi (1964) described these conflicts as power struggles wherein reform leads to
resistance. Resistance to change is defined as the “affective, cognitive and behavioral
response aimed at maintaining the status quo with the hope of stopping or delaying
change” (p. 678). Berkovich (2011) described the influence individual teachers have on
educational reform when he argued that teachers interpret policy as they see fit and when
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they do not support the change, it has little chance of succeeding (p. 564). McDonnell and
Elmore (1987) went further suggesting, “People who stand to lose power will not stand
idly by while it occurs. They will mount resistance to the proposed change, and if change
occurs anyway, they may work to sabotage it” (p. 148).
At the intersection of “paradigm and procedural policy shift” are school
superintendents. In the past, superintendents have been somewhat immune to shifts in
policy, as legislative policy mandates have for the most part, not dictated educational
practice nor influenced the collective bargaining process. Fowler (2009) stated that
superintendents have “traditionally been somewhat isolated and insulated from the
pressures of the outside world. For the most part, they have stayed within the boundaries
of their district” (p. 602). This has changed however, with the influx of new legislative
mandates that increasingly dictate almost all aspects of school life including
compensation procedures such as PA 205.
Summary
The influence of the once powerful teachers’ unions in Michigan has steadily
eroded since the revision of PERA and the passage of Proposal A in 1994. A host of
constraints and limits on the collective bargaining process has shifted the balance of
power to school district boards and administration. This can be seen with the passage of a
set of legislative mandates that prohibit negotiating on an increasing number of topics
and new requirements such as implementing some form of merit pay. This requirement is
at odds with the nearly universal adoption of the salary and step schedule used for
determining teacher compensation, and is inconsistent with the research evidence, which
indicates merit pay has limited effectiveness at improving student achievement. Merit pay

53

has also been generally unsustainable. Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012) recently
articulated key themes that define the challenges merit pay faces when imposed or chosen
as an alternative compensation system. It is from the lens of Marsh (2012) and Rice et
al.’s (2012) research that the experiences of the nine superintendents in this study were
framed.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
The methodological approach used in this study is a qualitative phenomenological
model, designed to explore the feelings and perceptions of superintendents regarding the
internal and external contextual conditions that influence school superintendents’
response to a legislative change that requires districts to adopt merit pay in Michigan.
Nine superintendents were selected from a sample of the Mackinac Center Merit Pay
Survey of 2012 (Van Beek & Spaulding, 2012). These superintendents negotiated at least
one contract with their teachers association between 2011 and 2015. Information was
collected using semi-structured interview questions, and transcribed and analyzed using
coding and pattern analysis techniques in order to develop a cluster of meaning and
themes. The sections below describe the study’s research design, research questions,
population, sampling design, data collection procedures, the duration of research, risk to
subjects, data analysis, and role of the investigator in greater detail. It is hoped that the
findings of this study will provide deeper understanding of strategic decision-making
processes and contextual conditions that guided the nine superintendents, and provide
policymakers and school leaders with awareness of the process of this policy
implementation in the face of conflicting tensions.
Research Design
This study utilized qualitative inquiry, as it provides a framework for
understanding what Denzin and Lincoln (1994) described as “historical moments and
social problems” (p. 234). As the revised school code section 1250 represents a
“historical moment,” and a complex “social problem,” qualitative research is well suited
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to understanding this phenomenon. Qualitative research is a useful approach to
uncovering and answering what is happening, as well as what these happenings mean to
the people engaged in them. This fits with Creswell’s (1994) definition of a qualitative
study “as an inquiry process of understanding a social or human problem, based on
building a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed views of
informants, and conducted in a natural setting” (p. 2). The characteristics of qualitative
research match the purpose of this study, as it offers a picture of the participant
perspective in order to explore human behavior within the context of the problem or issue
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Qualitative research is rooted in a phenomenological paradigm,
which holds that reality is socially constructed through individual or collective definitions
of the situation (Firestone, 1987). The strengths of qualitative methods are concrete
depiction of detail, portrayal of process in an active mode, and attention to the
perspectives of those studied (Fossey et al., 2002).
In this study, phenomenological methodology was chosen as it is a “strategy for
doing research which involves an investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon
within its real-life context” (Robson, 1993, p. 146). Creswell (2013) defined
phenomenological research as inquiry into a phenomenon (in this case, the requirement to
implement merit pay) by studying a group of individuals who have lived the experience.
It is a useful tool for the study of key players, key situations, and critical incidents
(Hitchcock & Hughes, 1995; Miles & Huberman, 1994).
Nine superintendents were interviewed where they will explore their reasons why
and how they responded to section 1250 of the revised school code. These
superintendents were carefully selected to represent one of three predetermined responses
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to the merit pay provision. These three predetermined responses include three that did not
implement 1250, labeled as the Status Quo response. Three that provided a bonus to the
teachers, but did not alter the salary and step schedule, labeled as the Egalitarian
response. And three that eliminated the salary and step schedule, replacing it with a
performance based system, labeled as the Differentiated response.
The responses from the superintendents in this study were analyzed from the
perspective of previous key research studies that identified a set of barriers to past merit
pay reform efforts (i.e., Marsh, 2012; Rice et al., 2012). It is suggested from these
research studies that at least five implementation barriers could influence the decisions
made by superintendents.
Research Questions
This study attempts to provide answers to how selected superintendents in
Michigan made decisions regarding the implementation the new merit pay compensation
requirement as defined in section 1250, and to a greater extent, understand what internal
and external factors guided superintendents as they made those decisions. In order to
conduct this qualitative study, the researcher proposed questions that would guide the
investigation. They are:
1. How did superintendents in selected mid-western school districts understand and
respond to the requirements of the school code revision in section 1250?
2. What factors influenced and guided the decisions of superintendents as they
responded to the requirements promulgated by section 1250, and under what
contextual conditions?
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3. Were the influences and contextual conditions different between those
superintendents that implemented section 1250 and those that did not?
4. Did the influences and contextual conditions experienced by the superintendents
in this study differ from those identified by Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012)?
Population
In this research, the boundaries of the study include the criteria that identify the
“population” or subjects of the research (Yin, 2003). In this study, the 2012 Mackinac
Survey provided the bulk of the data used to categorize the district response to the
changes in legislature (Van Beek & Spaulding, 2012). Additionally, the researcher
through his contacts with other superintendents updated the list to provide a broader
sample. Superintendents eligible to be included in the study were those that negotiated a
contract with their teachers association from 2011 to 2015, and who had responded to the
2012 Mackinac Center Merit Pay Survey (Van Beek & Holland, 2012). Only actively
employed superintendents (i.e., those who engaged in these negotiations) were eligible.
Those superintendents who answered the Mackinac Center Merit Pay Survey
were categorized into one of three categories based on the degree merit pay transformed
the salary/step schedule compensation plan. These three categories include: Status Quo,
those that did not implement any form of merit pay nor make changes based on section
1250; Egalitarian, those that defined a merit based compensation on top of existing salary
and step schedule, but did not make any changes to the salary and step schedule; and
Differentiated, those that eliminated the salary and step schedule in favor of a merit pay
form of compensation. After categorizing superintendents based upon the three
categories, nine superintendents were identified and invited to participate in the study.
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Sampling Design
This study utilized a purposeful sample, which Patton (1990) argued is a sample
from which the most can be learned. He suggested that purposeful samples are powerful
because they are “information rich which allows one to learn a great deal about issues of
central importance of the case” (p. 169). In order to identify a purposeful sample, a
criterion-based selection process must be used. To this end, Merriman (1998) suggested a
list of attributes or conditions must be identified that are essential to the study, followed
by a process to locate units based on the criteria.
Based upon information collected from the Mackinac Center Merit Pay Survey,
there appeared to be three types of response to 1250. As described previously, a total of
nine superintendents were invited to participate in the study, three from each category of
response: Status Quo, Egalitarian, and Differentiated. The nine superintendents were
identified in order to provide a “maximum variation of the sample” (Patton, 1990, p.
172). Maximum variation sampling involves identifying those who represent the widest
possible range of characteristics of interest for this study (Miles & Huberman, 1994).
This categorization of districts served as the inclusionary criteria used to define the
settings for the study. Again, the inclusionary criteria were based on a category of
responses to 1250. In Table 5, the criteria for identifying the superintendents for
placement in one of the three categories are defined.
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Table 5
Categories of Response to Merit Pay Requirement
Compensation
Characteristic

Status Quo

Egalitarian

Differentiated

Equal Bonus

No

Yes

No

Bonus Differentiated

No

No

Yes

Keep Salary/Step
Schedule

Yes

Yes

No

Data Collection Procedures
Upon approval from HSIRB to conduct the research, nine superintendents were
identified from the typologies of response to school code revision 1250, with informed
consent obtained from participating school superintendents. Initial contact with
superintendents in each of the three identified categories was made over the phone, as the
researcher is a superintendent and had a professional connection with the other
respondents in this study. The researcher provided an in depth overview of the purpose of
the study to each consenting respondent. In addition, each respondent was given
information about the purpose of the study, its duration, and the risks and benefits of the
study. The researcher also described data collection procedures, and efforts to ensure that
their participation remained strictly confidential, with no names of individuals and place
of employment released or otherwise reported. The researcher asked each participating
respondent if he or she was still employed within the district when decisions regarding
merit pay were implemented according to the school code. If the superintendent was
employed during this time and amenable to participation in this study, then the researcher
sent a letter of consent to the superintendent.
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Hatch (2002) provided an in-depth illustration of the meaning of informed
consent. In this regard, he identified the following attributes of a researcher’s
responsibility:


Defining that the study involves research.



The purpose of the research and duration of each participant’s involvement.



A description of the procedures used to collect data.



A review of any foreseeable risks or discomforts.



The benefits to participants and others.



A description on how confidentiality will be maintained, how records will be
stored, and who will have access to the data.



Contact information with questions about the research and their rights.



Acknowledgement that participation is voluntary and they can withdraw at any time
(p. 64).
Following informed consent, the researcher made contact with each

superintendent, and dates were established to conduct semi-structured interviews. These
interview questions, as illustrated in the Appendix, served as the script of the investigator.
Each question was broad, loosely structured, and closely aligned to the research questions
and merit pay barriers defined in previous research.
Several additional issues were addressed at the beginning of the interviews,
including investigator motives and research purpose, protection of the respondents using
pseudonyms, decisions over final review of the study content, and logistics of the process
(Merriman, 1998). The interview questions were defined in advance, but the format and
exact wording could change during the interview to increase the completeness of the data
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and in response to those interviewed. Such flexibility made the data more complete and
eliminated potential gaps; thus the interview, while semi-structured, remained
conversational and situational (Merriman, 1998). The interview data was collected and
stored by the researcher in a locked file cabinet in hard copy and on a password protected
computer hard drive.
An important element to facilitate the interview is the atmosphere of trust. Trust
in this study was enhanced due to the researcher’s familiarity with the topic and his
present employment as a school superintendent. This background provided the
respondents with a sense that the interviewer understood the complexity of the role
superintendents must play and the decisions they must attend to in this complex role. To
enhance the data collection process, the researcher piloted study the data collection
instruments with a superintendent who was not be part of the study for the purpose of
ensuring the adequacy of the survey, and if need be, making improvements in the
interview protocol. This took place prior to the collection of the research data.
Duration of Research
The steps in the research process included approval of committee of proposal,
approval by HSIRB, research and interviews, research analysis and dissertation
completion, and presentation of dissertation/oral defense. The proposed timeline for these
steps was:
September 2014

Proposal approval

October 2014

HSIRB approval

October 2014

Pilot study to assess interview protocol
(Timeline suspended November 2014 to May 2015 due to
unforeseen researcher illness)
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May/July 2015

Data Collection

August 2015 to
November 2016

Research analysis and dissertation completion

Winter 2017

Presentation of dissertation/oral defense
Risks to Subjects

No major risks were anticipated for participants in this study. One potential area
of risk is the acknowledgement by three of the superintendents that their district is not in
compliance with school code revision 1250, which mandates some form of merit pay be
used as a form of teacher compensation. There are no sanctions associated with not
implementing 1250, and it appears that the vast majority of school districts are not in
compliance currently with this element of the school code.
In order to minimize this and any other risks, pseudonyms were used for all those
interviewed, and for school district names and locations. Allowing the respondents to
identify convenient date and location for the interviews reduced inconvenience. The
researcher traveled to the respondent’s location. It was also made clear that those
interviewed could stop the interview at any time, refuse to answer any question, or end
the interviews when they wished. There were no invasive procedures utilized in this
study. In addition, the audio recordings were destroyed after transcripts were produced
and approved by the respondents. All transcripts are kept in locked storage by the
researcher, and data contained on the researcher’s personal computer is password
protected. At the completion of the dissertation, the hard copy and text-based data in the
computer will be destroyed. There are no other known risks associated with participating
in this study.
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Data Analysis
Data analysis is a search for meanings (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Analysis
means organizing and interpreting data in order to see patterns, identify themes, discover
relationships, and develop explanations—to do what Walcott (1995) calls “mindwork” (p.
18). The focus of the analysis according to Yin (2003), hinges on linking the data to the
research questions and by explicating the criteria by which the findings are to be
interpreted.
During this study, there were three stages of analysis that provide what Richards
(2011) described as “data reduction” (p. 58). The first stage involved transcribing the
interview notes from the nine recordings, reading the transcriptions, and then re-reading
with the intent to annotate researcher thoughts and comments within each document.
These annotated comments provide, according to Richards (2011), a way to capture
initial researcher thoughts about what is read. These annotations within the document
serve as personal memos that are critical in developing “themes emerging up from the
document…they encourage quick and easy documentation of the ideas and the ways
ideas grow” (Richards, 2011, p. 80).
In the second stage, the transcribed interviews were coded or organized into topic
categories, which at the same time reduce the data into manageable amounts. The
purpose of topic coding is the organization of the interview information into categories
based on the research questions of the study. Richards (2011) described this process as
“involving little interpretation as you are putting the data where they belong” (p. 100).
Topic coding creates an overall catalog of responses. Hatch (2002) described topic
coding as “dividing everything collected into groups or categories on the basis for some
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cannon for disaggregating the whole phenomena under study” (p. 152). The typological
analysis in this study was based on the research questions. Prior to the analysis of the
interviews, each superintendent reviewed the transcribed notes for error and authenticity.
The interview protocol was semi-structured and based on the research questions, with
emphasis how the superintendents understand and have responded to PA 205, the
influences and contextual conditions which guided their decisions. The superintendents’
responses to these interviews in the nine settings stood alone. Categories of response and
themes were identified for each superintendent.
This was a multi-case analysis, wherein abstractions and comparisons are built
across cases. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), the researcher attempts “to see
processes and outcomes that occur across many cases to understand how they are
qualified by local conditions, and thus develop more sophisticated descriptions and
powerful explanations” (p. 172). The steps used for analyzing the data include putting the
information into different arrays, making a matrix and putting the data into categories,
and creating data displays (Merriman, 1998). Additionally, it was important to look for
second-order relationships in building explanations. It was also important to rely on the
theoretical propositions for analyzing the data and to test for rival explanations
(Merriman, 1998, p. 112).
The third stage in the analysis was to review the data from the perspective of the
research literature, which has defined five key barriers to the implementation of merit
pay. This is the subject of the fourth research question: How do the influences and
contextual conditions differ from the barriers identified by Marsh (2012) and Rice et al.
(2012)? The same process as previously defined was used to analyze this data,
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specifically, the creation of arrays, making a matrix and categories, and identifying
second-order relationships.
Following the data analysis process, the approach for explanation building is to
make initial theoretical statements, then compare the findings of the cases both within
and cross-case against these statements. Miles and Huberman (1994) described this
analysis as:
Moving up from the empirical trenches to a more conceptual overview of
the landscape. We are no longer dealing with observables, but also with
unobservables and are connecting the two with successive layers of
inferential glue. (p. 261)
Role of the Investigator
The researcher is most commonly considered the main instrument for data
collection, analysis, and interpretation. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that bias
is a part of the research (Miles & Huberman, 1994). There are two types of researcher
bias. They are: (1) the effect of researcher on the study participants; and (2) the effects of
study participants on the researcher (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Examining researcher
bias is an important effort to self-analyze these biases. To facilitate this process,
Onwegbuzie et al. (2010) suggested the concept of debriefing the researcher. The process
used in this study entailed the researcher being interviewed by a person that was not
involved directly in the study and who was familiar with the research topic. In order to
facilitate this process, during the pilot study the researcher debriefed with the interviewer,
who as a colleague (superintendent), and as one who has conducted qualitative research
in the past, could assist the researcher in defining his own ideological position and bias,
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as well as being a “devil’s advocate.” Such a process assisted the researcher in what
Onwegbuzie (2010) described as “bracketing one’s bias” during the research process (p.
705).
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
In this chapter, the researcher provides the findings of the results obtained from
superintendents in selected school districts in a mid-western state. The reader is reminded
that the overall purpose of this study was to uncover the lived experiences of selected
public school superintendents in relationship to how they responded to the change in this
mid-western state’s public school code. The statute in question required public school
districts to introduce a compensation system that is based upon individual teacher merit,
rather than continuing a system based upon employment seniority. This change in
compensation runs counter to prevailing practices in regards to how teachers are
compensated.
This study provides a descriptive analysis as to what selected superintendents did
in response to this mandated statute, why they did it, and equally important, provides an
explanation as to why these district administrators took the action they did, particularly in
comparison to those districts that did not adhere to these state-imposed statutes. This
study will provide answers to the following four questions. They are:
1. How did superintendents in selected mid-western school districts understand and
respond to the requirements of the school code revision in section 1250?
2. What factors influenced and guided the decisions of superintendents as they
responded to the requirements promulgated by section 1250, and under what
contextual conditions?
3. Were the influences and contextual conditions different between those
superintendents that implemented section 1250 and those that did not?
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4. Did the influences and contextual conditions experienced by the superintendents
in this study differ from those identified by Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012)?
To facilitate the data collection process, the researcher developed an interview
protocol that served as a guide during the interview process. After the interviews were
transcribed, the researcher read and re-read the transcriptions multiple times and coded
the responses that emerged in the transcripts. The data analysis process consisted of
developing themes, sub-themes and independent themes within each category for
research question 1 through 4.
The researcher developed an operational definition of themes as those statements
present in 3 of 3 interviews within a category (i.e., all Status Quo districts) and 3 of 3
across all categories (i.e., shared by Status Quo, Egalitarian, and Differentiated). The
definitions of sub-themes were those statements present within 2 of 3 interviews in a
category, and across 2 of 3 categories. Independent themes were defined as those that
existed in all three districts within one category, but were not found in any other
category.
Research Question 1: Superintendent Response to Section 1250
Research Question 1 focused on how superintendents understood and responded
to the requirements of the revised school code section 1250. In order to answer this (and
the other research questions) a total of nine superintendents from this mid-western state
were selected and asked to participate in the study. Potential subjects were identified
based on the 2012 Mackinac Center Merit Pay Survey and the researcher’s direct
communication with superintendents. The total number of potential candidates for
inclusion in the study numbered 114 superintendents.
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Following the identification of the total possible number of subjects in the study,
the researcher categorized all 114 districts and their respective superintendents were
categorized into one of three categories: Status Quo, Egalitarian, or Differentiated. The
categories of response are defined in Table 6.
Table 6
Categories of Response to Section 1250 of the Michigan School Code
Compensation
Characteristic

Status Quo

Egalitarian

Differentiated

Equal Bonus

No

Yes

No

Bonus
Differentiated

No

No

Yes

Eliminate
Salary/Step
Schedule

No

No

Yes

Based the categories of response, 114 districts and superintendents were in the
sample. As seen in Table 7, these 114 districts were categorized into one of the three
categories. The number of districts/superintendents in each category and the percentage
within the overall sample are listed below.
Table 7
Number and Percentage of Districts/Superintendents by Categories
Category

Number of
Districts/Superintendents

Percentage of Total

Status Quo

85

74%

Egalitarian

22

19%

Differentiated

9

7%

Note. N = 114 superintendents.
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As indicated in Table 7, the vast majority (74%) of the superintendents
maintained the districts existing compensation procedures. In these “status quo” districts
performance pay systems were not implemented and the step system was not altered.
Three superintendents representing this category of response agreed to participate in the
study. In order to maintain their anonymity each of these superintendents were given the
number 1, 2, or 3.
Twenty-two (22) of the superintendents were identified as Egalitarian, as they
provided performance bonus to teachers without otherwise altering the salary and step
scale. This represented 19% of the total number of superintendents who responded to the
original survey. Selected respondents were given the numbers 4, 5, and 6 to preserve their
anonymity in the study.
The final group consisted of superintendents who implemented the revision to
school code section 1250 by building a new compensation system based on performance
pay and not the salary and step scale. This small group numbered nine superintendents
and represented 7% of those who responded to the survey. To preserve their anonymity
selected respondents were labeled as 7, 8, and 9.
Status Quo Superintendents
Superintendents 1, 2, and 3 did not implement the requirements of section 1250 of
the school code and have been identified as Status Quo. For example, the superintendent
in District 1 did not comply with section 1250 and were not planning on complying
anytime in the near future saying, “It just seems like another not very well thought out
requirement by the state. I don’t think we will ever provide performance based
compensation.” Superintendents in Status Quo districts indicated they had not spent much
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time thinking about or creating strategies to implement section 1250. When asked what
they knew about the school code revision, Superintendent 2 replied, “It’s not real deep. I
know that by law we are obligated to put some sort of merit pay into our contract, but we
don’t have it.” Likewise, Superintendent 3 knew there was a new law, but had not paid
much attention to it: “I’m not sure exactly what we are supposed to do, but nobody is
watching, or seems to care.”
Egalitarian Superintendents
The Egalitarian superintendents seemed to have greater insight and understanding
of section 1250. For example, Superintendent 4 said, “I know there are two facets to it.
One is merit pay and another part has to do with bargaining.” Similarly, Superintendent 5
stated, “I’m familiar with the law. We are supposed to provide merit pay. The law doesn’t
say how to do it, it just says we need to do it.” How the Egalitarian superintendents chose
to comply with the school code revisions was by providing a bonus. According to
Superintendent 4, “I know we play the same game lots of districts do. If you get a
satisfactory evaluation you will get a $10 pay bump.” Superintendents 4, 5, and 6
provided teachers with $10 at the end of the year as long as they attained the Satisfactory
or Effective rating. Superintendent 6, while providing the bonus, did not like “playing the
game,” stating:
I don’t like the idea that to become compliant you offer $10 dollars. You
know, I think that if you can get really good teachers hired and you have a
really positive culture, and you have them see you wanting to compensate
them for going above and beyond – being here, being good in front of the
kids, and doing what needs to be done – then I think you need to find the
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money in the budget. I would like to get to the point where I can get the
money for this from the salary and step schedule, but I’m not in the place
where I can do that yet.
Differentiated Superintendents
The third category of superintendent response was identified as Differentiated. In
these districts, the salary and step scale, were eliminated in favor of a new performance
based (merit pay) compensation system. The superintendents in these districts understood
the school code revisions as an opportunity to overhaul the existing compensation
structures within their districts. For example, the superintendent in District 7 described
the school code revisions stating:
This was a big deal. The revised school code suggests that how we were
paying teachers was out of date. As such, we proposed a whole new
system where the steps and lanes are removed out of the contract and
compensation would be based on performance because this is truly what
the law said. It was a difficult conversation with the union, but that didn’t
matter because the PERA was amended determining that both
performance evaluation and pay were both prohibited subjects of
bargaining. If you follow the law, anything that had to do with evaluation
and pay increases, showed as a strikeout and was removed from the
contract.
While superintendents in Districts 7 through 9 eliminated the salary and step scale
model of compensation, the resulting systems developed were each unique. In District 7,
the performance pay compensation program outlined a system wherein teachers were
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eligible to accumulate units of performance-based compensation for the next school year
based upon a list of criteria. For example, teachers could accumulate one unit worth $300
added to their base pay if they have an Effective rating on the teacher evaluation system,
their students showed evidence of academic growth, and had attained a BA or higher,
plus attaining nine additional graduate credits. Two units could be acquired if teachers
had an Effective rating on the teacher evaluation system, their students showed evidence
of academic achievement, they had attained a BA or higher plus 18 graduate credits, and
these teachers were eligible to receive $600 dollars added to their base pay. Three units
worth $900 required a Highly Effective rating, evidence of student growth, and a BA or
higher, plus having attained 27 additional graduate credits. All teachers’ base pay was
“grandfathered in” into this system.
In District 8, rather than units, a point system was established. Teachers received
a $500 pay raise to their base salary, and an additional $500 in merit compensation, if
they qualified. These criteria were based on points-earned formula that consisted of 39%
on teacher evaluation rating, 34% on student growth, 11% on attendance, 9% on
significant relevant accomplishments, and 7% on participation in district professional
development, respectfully.
The system in District 9 was different than in Districts 7 or 8. The system in
District 9 was based on teachers earning a cumulative 2% increase to their base if rated
Effective. If teachers were rated Highly Effective, they earned an additional 2% noncumulative bonus. To qualify for the increase, the fund balance of the district was
required to remain above 12%.
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Research Question 2: Influences and Contextual Conditions
The purpose of research question 2 was to uncover influences and contextual
conditions that guided each superintendent’s decision-making processes in response to
section 1250 of the school code. To achieve this task, interviews were conducted with the
nine superintendents in order to identify common themes and sub-themes within each
category of superintendents. Themes were identified if they appeared in all three
transcripts of interviews with superintendents within a category. Sub-themes were
statements made by 2 of 3 superintendents within a category. The themes and sub-themes
are shown in Table 8.
Table 8
Themes and Sub-Themes Within Each Category
Category

Themes

Sub-themes

Status Quo

Accountability
Conflict Avoidance
Need for Sanctions

Merit Pay Research
Lack of Stakeholder Support
Culture

Egalitarian

Accountability
Conflict Avoidance
Need for Sanctions

Lack of Stakeholder Support
Culture

Accountability
Policy Champion

Need for Stakeholder Support
Need for Union Trust
Culture
Effective Teacher Evaluation

Differentiated

Status Quo Superintendents
Within the Status Quo districts, the influences and contextual conditions that
emerged during the interviews consisted of three themes and three sub-themes. The three
themes identified include support for the concept of accountability, conflict avoidance,
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and the need for sanctions. The sub-themes included concerns regarding ineffectiveness
of merit pay in research literature, the lack of stakeholder support, and issues with the fit
between school culture and merit pay.
Accountability. The first theme identified was Accountability. While
Superintendents 1 through 3 did not implement merit pay, they all advocated the need for
increased accountability in teacher compensation. According to Superintendent 1:
I understand why there is interest in merit pay because someone who is
not performing at their craft can get compensated the same as a very
effective teacher. Our system does not reflect equity based on teaching
skills.
Superintendent 2 made a similar observation stating, “It’s time for improvement,
everything is evolving. For a great teacher they are not paid well enough, and for poor
teachers they are overpaid.” District 3 superintendent made this assessment:
There are some teachers who are progressing on the scale who are less
than “effective” and you can’t take it away. Why should they get a raise
for doing an adequate or even poor job. That is the flaw - guaranteed
advancement is very frustrating.
Conflict avoidance. The second shared theme identified in the transcripts was
Conflict Avoidance, or the need to avoid conflict by implementing performance pay.
They all expressed concern that implementing section 1250 of the school code would
lead to a personal and professional cost to superintendents. The superintendent in District
1 stated:
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Our last contract was a concessionary contract and teachers are still in
shock about that. Adding merit pay to the mix would exacerbate our
problems and would not be worth the cost it would take to get something
meaningful.
In District 2, the superintendent also identified cost as a concern when he
expressed:
There is no way I could bring this up with the union. Their game would be
to fight as hard as they could against this. There is value in fighting for
things, but you are not going to get a lot of other things accomplished
while you are doing that and you would come out scarred. I don’t like how
superintendents turn over so quickly. So many of us are concerned about
keeping our job because these jobs have such a short shelf life. It’s a costbenefit thing. You have to judge the cost versus the benefit.
Similarly, the superintendent in District 3 stated:
I’ve tried to negotiate some form of merit pay in past negotiations, but it
has never worked. It was too contentious. They were nervous about it
because it had never been done before. If it’s not broke, don’t fix it. Why
should I put my career at risk and create controversy and conflict?
Need for sanctions. The third theme articulated by all status quo superintendents
was Need for Sanctions, or the recognition that section 1250 did not define any sanctions
for lack of implementation. All three Status Quo superintendents stated they would only
implement performance pay if clear and consistent sanctions were enforced by the State.
District 3 superintendent stated, “Performance based compensation will never happen in
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this State unless those in charge of the checkbook change the rules. If they withhold the
money, then we would comply.” The District 2 superintendent also described the need for
sanctions when he said:
I was at a superintendents’ retreat with our schools attorney and he said
that the law requires us to implement merit pay. That led to an interesting
theoretical discussion where I said ‘if I break the law, might I get my
wrist slapped, or could our funding be cut?’ He basically said ‘it matters
whose paying attention and no one is paying attention.’ My guess is that
we won’t make a substantive change unless of course, someone from
above says we are going to enforce merit pay.
Similarly, District 1 superintendent expressed:
I’m only going to do something if I have to. I’ve not heard anyone say
there are extreme consequences for not having it that will get us fired. So,
why should we? I think if our school attorney tells me that financially we
will get pinched really hard, then maybe.
Merit pay research. The first sub-theme expressed by two of the three
superintendents was regarding past research on merit pay. In District 1, the
superintendent stated the following:
I’m not convinced there is any great model out there that we could use
that seems logical and fair. If there was a good alternative I think we
would see more districts doing it. My understanding of the research is that
they have shown merit pay does not work. Why should we do something
that does not work?
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The District 2 superintendent said something similar, “I don’t like the word ‘merit pay.’
I’m not sure it has been shown to work and it creates a whole level of discussion and
angst among teachers and administrators around playing favorites.”
Lack of stakeholder support. The second sub-theme that emerged was similar to
the statements regarding conflict avoidance. Two of the superintendents specifically
noted that “our teachers will not, under any conditions, support a change to merit pay.”
The lack of stakeholder support was deemed a critical barrier to successful
implementation of section 1250.
Culture. These statements regarding lack of stakeholder support were also
associated with the third sub-theme, namely merit pay not matching the egalitarian ethos
of school culture and the historical prevalence the salary and step model. In District 3,
the superintendent expressed it best stating:
Our teachers believe in fairness and not playing favorites. They would not
trust a merit pay model because it does not treat everyone the same. The
historical roots on how we pay teachers are so engrained into our system I
don’t believe it is possible to change. Our culture would not allow it, and
I’m not planning on messing with our culture.
Egalitarian Superintendents
The Egalitarian superintendents identified three themes: accountability, conflict
avoidance, and the need for sanction. Two sub-themes were also defined: the lack of
stakeholder support, and the cultural barriers to implementing merit pay.
Accountability. The concerns the Egalitarian superintendents expressed were
almost identical to those communicated by the Status Quo superintendents. For example,
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Egalitarian superintendents 4, 5, and 6 expressed philosophical support for accountability
in compensation. Superintendent 4 said:
There is a lot of unfairness in the way we compensate people right now. I
look at a ten-year veteran who, as a English teacher, is working with 100
kids and has to take home hundreds of essays every two weeks versus a
physical education teacher who makes the same amount of money, and
who shows up in sweat clothes with a whistle around their neck, can walk
out the door at night with no additional responsibilities. We ought to put
more value on certain positions, and we certainly need to ramp up our
expectations for teachers if they are going to continue to get step raises.
Superintendent 5 had a similar view of merit pay providing accountability stating:
I do think we need to do something to motivate young people to come into
this profession. The way we pay people now is not reflective of their
worth, nor how effective they are in their job day-to-day. We live in the
age of accountability in education today. Eventually how we should our
employees accountable for their performance.
Superintendent 6 was blunt in his assessment of merit pay:
Of course we should do it. It is the right thing to do. People should be paid
based on their worth to the organization which in our case is their
effectiveness as a teacher. We expect our students to be accountable, why
shouldn’t we hold our teachers to the same standard.
Conflict avoidance. The second theme that emerged for Egalitarian
superintendents was the concern that implementing merit pay would increase conflict
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within the district and would come at a cost. This concern regarding conflict was very
similar to the views expressed by the status quo superintendents. In this regard,
Superintendent 4 opined:
I think making this kind of change would take a lot of work and I think
there would be a lot of resistance. I’m not sure I can come up with an
alternative system but I am sure the union will fight like hell over this. I
don’t think it is worth the hassle.
The superintendent in District 5 also talked about conflict in the context of cost and
courage when he said:
I’m not sure if I’m courageous enough, but that’s a two-way street, as I
don’t see our union interested either. You know the union push back is
going to be hazardous and I don’t have the fire in my belly to go after it,
nor do I have the support to go after it, or the encouragement for that
matter. You cannot change leadership often and keep change going in
schools. There is a lot of research to support that. With stability, good
things can happen.
Need for sanctions. The third theme shared by Egalitarian and the Status Quo
superintendents was the view that only with sanctions would they be inclined to comply
with section 1250. Superintendent 4 quipped: “I’m really hesitant to make any changes
unless we are required by the state.” The superintendent in District 5 made similar
observations:
You know, until the state comes up with a fair and equitable way to fund
this or a fair and equitable way to administer this, I would say you better
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keep your eye on keeping your budget in shape. Unless there are sanctions
or funding, I think merit pay is dead on arrival.
Superintendent 6 similarly stated:
This seems like another unfunded mandate from the state. It’s legislators
with no school experience telling us what to do. Why should I take on the
responsibility of making such a dramatic change and upset the apple cart if
no one from Lansing cares or monitors us. Until they do, I don’t expect we
will make any changes other than meet the letter of law by providing a
ridiculous bonus of $10.
Superintendent 6 furthermore expressed the need for sanctions:
I would say that I have a jaded view on making wholesale changes in how
we pay teachers. It’s because of mistrust, and not just in our district
between the union, the MEA, and the board with a long history of both
sides thinking things have not gone well. The idea of changing
compensation to being determined by your performance level makes
people think, “That’s perfect; it gives the district an opportunity to
evaluate me out. They will find me not effective so they don’t have to pay
me and they can save money.” There would be a price to pay for this, and
the price is ongoing problems and conflict. The only way we would go to
a merit pay system was if the state had sanctions in place that necessitated
we make the change.
Lack of stakeholder support and culture. The two sub-themes communicated
by two of the egalitarian superintendents were also nearly identical to those defined by
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the Status Quo superintendents: the lack of stakeholder support and the challenge of
implementing merit pay into a culture which rejects it. For example, the superintendent in
District 5 stated:
I know the teachers would not tolerate us monkeying around with how we
pay them. They would never support it. In our district we work
collaboratively together on problems and how we pay people is not
perceived as a problem. Maybe how much we pay them, but not how we
pay them. Until our culture changes we will do the minimum to stay in
compliance with the law and that is it.
Differentiated Superintendents
Two themes were identified in this study as expressed by the differentiated
superintendents: the importance of accountability, and the impact of a “policy champion”
to facilitate the implementation of merit pay. There were also four sub-themes: the need
for stakeholder support, the importance of gaining union trust, the cultural change
required, and the need for an effective teacher evaluation system.
Accountability. Like all superintendents in this study, the differentiated
superintendents identified accountability as a key reason for making compensation
changes. Superintendent 7 said, “Education is one of the few professions where you get
rewarded and career advancement without accountability or measures of performance.
That is not right and it’s not ok.” The superintendent in District 8 communicated a similar
viewpoint:
Teachers know which teachers do not put the effort in. Unfortunately, they
also know that no matter what, at the end of the day, it’s how much time
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you put into the district, not how good you are that determines how much
you are paid. Our new approach gives them the ability to get a little more
if they are effective. Before if you were breathing, you got a step. Moving
up the career ladder only required time, now it requires performance and
accountability.
The Differentiated superintendents also had a deeper understanding of section
1250, and acknowledged they had a legal responsibility to be accountable to the school
code. For example, Superintendent 9 said:
If you really look at the requirements of 1250, it says that every school
district shall adopt and implement a system of performance pay that will
determine pay and additional compensation. In working with legal counsel
we determined that the step and lane pay scale wouldn’t be the way future
pay increases ought to be considered. So the way out of the box would be
to create a whole new system, which would exclude the step and lane
system because that is truly what the law reads. You do what you are
supposed to do.
Likewise, Superintendent 7 continued: “The law had a lot to do with this change. We had
to do something. It was the right thing to do, so we did it. The changes in the school code
created this.”
Policy champion. The second theme identified by all three superintendents in this
category was the acknowledgement of the need for a policy champion to facilitate the
adoption of these changes. For most, someone at their local ISD, whether it was the chief
financial officer or the ISD superintendent, was required to assist district superintendents
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in understanding section 1250 and facilitating their change. Superintendent 7 was the first
to use the term policy champion stating:
The CFO kept us in the loop. We knew that legislation was pending and
we discussed with each other what we were going to do if it came down.
Once it happened we were pleased, and then even more pleased when it
became a prohibited subject of bargaining. Without the CFO we would not
have really paid attention to the school code change, nor would we have
acted in isolation. We needed him. He was our “policy champion.”
The superintendent in District 9 echoed this perspective when he stated:
Based on a series of meeting conducted at the ISD, we decided that the
old system of steps and lanes pay scale where an employee, simply by
showing up to work regularly, got an automatic pay raise is now, or at
least should be, over. This was a big decision and required lots of buy-in.
I’m not sure the buy-in would have occurred if we didn’t have the
leadership from the ISD superintendent who organized these meetings.
Superintendent 9 was a member of a committee to work towards a common merit
pay framework, but they were not able to reach consensus. Instead, the superintendents
each created within their own districts merit pay models unique to their situation. This
was expressed by Superintendent 9 when he stated, “I think what got us going was the
work we did at the ISD. It became kind of a competition. If one of the local districts can
do it, why can’t we?” Superintendent 7 also reflected on the ISD meetings saying the
following:
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We tried to standardize with a county committee, but that did not get far.
What worked better was putting this on the agenda of the monthly
superintendents meeting at the ISD where they had a meeting of the
minds. I think you see the results in that over two-thirds of the districts in
the county have been able to achieve a 100% performance based
compensation model.
Need for stakeholder support and need for union trust. The Differentiated
superintendents communicated the first two sub-themes (need for stakeholder support and
union trust) in a similar fashion. Superintendent 7 stated, “I worked hard on making sure
the teachers were ‘mostly’ in support of this initiative. Without their support it would
have been a battle.” Similarly, The superintendent in District 9 intimated the importance
of union trust with the following sentiment:
We explained the laws and the teachers went along, in part because they
trusted us and they saw this as potentially a good thing as they had not
gotten any kind of raise for two years. Just the possibility to get
something, and move forward, was especially appealing for the younger
teachers.
Trust was also evident in District 7 as the superintendent described his workingrelationship with the union as:
Positive and we trust each other. We don’t always agree but we find ways
to work through the disagreements without any public displays of
dissension. Without trust none of these compensation changes had any
chance of success.
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Culture. The third sub-theme identified regarded changing the culture of the
district in order to develop a new merit based compensation system. The superintendent
in District 8 suggested this stating:
We could only change the minds of the teachers where they would accept
merit pay by celebrating the fact that the old system had worked well for
years, but we had no choice now. We had to change and move to a new
system that matched the law and the times. Celebrate the old, and move to
the new. Make sure you don’t harm the culture by talking about the old
way as a bridge to our newer improved method.
Effective teacher evaluation. The fourth and final sub-theme communicated by
the Differentiated superintendents involved the challenges and necessity of using a fair
system of teacher evaluation. The superintendent from District 9 summarizes this
challenge, as he made the following sentiment:
The toughest piece in this whole thing, from an administrator’s vantage, is
creating a fair and equitable evaluation system. Merit pay adds to the
already high stakes inherent in teacher evaluation. If you don’t get this
right, none of this will work. I think a lot of districts in the state have not
done anything hoping that the State comes in and prescribes it all.
Superintendent 8 had a similar view:
The challenge is with the evaluation process. I would say ours is the most
rigorous in the county by far. Measuring student growth brings its own
dilemmas because of what the State has done to us. I don’t have a good
answer on how to effectively measure student growth; there are so many
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challenges. I’m so disappointed after all the conversations and all the work
that has been done. The State can’t get its act together. They need to say,
“This will be the recommended tool in Michigan, and here are our
expectations for how to measure growth.”
Research Question 3: Comparison of Themes Among Categories
Whereas research question 2 focused on uncovering themes within each category,
research question 3 is designed to further explore the themes shared among the three
categories of superintendents. Based on this analysis, three types of themes were defined:
a theme, sub-theme, and independent theme. A theme is defined as an influence, or
contextual condition, shared by all three categories (i.e., Status Quo, Egalitarian, and
Differentiated). A sub-theme is an influence or contextual condition uncovered between 2
of 3 categories, whereas an independent theme is a theme that only exists in one category.
In all situations, all three superintendents in that category must share the theme. Table 9
shows the shared themes, sub-themes, and independent themes.
Table 9
Themes Among Categories
Theme Type
Themes
Sub-Themes

Status Quo

Egalitarian

Differentiated

Accountability

Accountability

Accountability

Conflict Avoidance

Conflict Avoidance

Need for Sanctions

Need for Sanctions

Independent Themes

Policy Champion
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Themes Across All Categories
There was only one theme that was consistent among all categories and across all
superintendents: Accountability. This was expressed numerous ways and numerous
times. Clearly, the superintendents felt that the current salary and step system, while
prevalent, did not facilitate teacher accountability, or student achievement.
Superintendent 7 communicated this belief:
I’m convinced that performance based compensation can lead to better
outcomes for teachers and students. I feel it represents a vision for change.
I also can’t understand why teachers’ who are so committed to
accountability with their students, are so reluctant to be held accountable
themselves. It seems like a double standard.
While all nine superintendents expressed a philosophical belief in the
concept of accountability and the need to change teacher compensation to match
this belief, only the Differentiated superintendents went further and suggested
they were accountable to the revision of the school code. Only the Differentiated
superintendents communicated personal accountability to the revised school code,
unlike the other categories of superintendents.
Sub-Themes Across Two Categories
The Status Quo and Egalitarian superintendents shared two sub-themes. These
included Conflict Avoidance and the Need for Sanctions. Superintendents in these two
categories justified their response to section 1250 by expressing concern that
implementing merit pay was not worth the effort because of the potential for conflict. It
was frequently stated that while merit pay might be philosophically and statutorily
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appropriate, changing the compensation system would come at great personal cost to a
superintendent. Superintendent 2 quipped:
Do we want to do it, Yeah? Could we do it, I doubt it. After all, getting the
teachers to agree to such a major change would be perceived as just one
more attack on them. You attack them and they will attack you back. I’m
not convinced my board would have the stomach to take on the teachers to
see this through. I worry that the ultimate loser in all of this would be me.
We all understand the lifespan of a typical superintendent.
The second sub-theme was a call for sanctions as a mechanism to facilitate
compliance with section 1250. Sanctions would provide the cover the superintendents
would need to take on the challenge of creating a new compensation system.
Superintendent 1 said it best:
The only way I can see doing this is if the state provided us some political
cover. Only if I have no choice, and the association understands that I
have no choice, can I see this happening.
Superintendent 3 also shared the sentiment that sanctions were necessary before
they would move to adopt 1250:
It depends on what the legislature will do. I don’t think this topic has their
interest or is in their wheelhouse. I don’t think they will add sanctions
anytime soon. If a Democratic legislature is in place this will probably be
reversed. If there is not a change, then there could come a time when the
legislature might get fed up, and they will get serious about this. If that
happens, then I can see change happening.
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Independent Themes
There was one independent theme in the differentiated category: the importance
of a policy champion. In this theme, the Differentiated superintendents acknowledged the
importance of strong leadership to assist the superintendents and districts make changes
in response to school code 1250. The Status Quo and Egalitarian superintendents did not
recognize the need for a policy champion or strong leadership as critical.
Research Question 4: Study Results Compared to Research Findings
In research question 4, a comparison is drawn between the themes that emerged in
this study with the recent research by Rice et al. (2012) and Marsh (2012), which
identifies common barriers and challenges that must be overcome if merit pay is to be
successful. Based on a meta-analysis of merit pay studies, Rice et al. (2012) identified
four sets of issues with the implementation of merit pay systems. Marsh (2012)
uncovered one additional barrier in her study of the New York City merit pay program.
Together, these two studies provide the most comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the
challenges associated with implementing merit pay. The challenges they identified
include:
1. Securing and maintaining stakeholder support. Rice et al. (2012) suggested
stakeholder buy-in is critical, as are the attainability of the award and the
transparency of the process (Rice et al., 2012).
2. Development of accurate and credible measures of educator performance. This is
the issue of “fairness” according to Rice et al. (2012). Teacher and student
achievement evaluations are problematic, as they occur infrequently, tend to be
superficial, may focus on narrow academic goals, can be biased because of
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demographic characteristics, lack training for evaluators, and are unable to measure
teachers in non-core areas (Rice et al., 2012).
3. The district’s financial capacity to implement and sustain the initiative. Most merit
pay programs according to Rice et al. (2012) have required additional supplemental
funds (Rice et al., 2012).
4. Lack of alignment of merit pay programs with district goals and culture of the work
environment. Merit pay is a substantial change in the norms of the work culture in
school. As the salary and step schedule is so durable, Rice et al. (2012) suggested
changing this model runs counter to established norms and produces ideological and
powerful backlash from teacher unions (Rice et al., 2012).
5. Administrators’ view their role as system maintenance with conflict avoidance as
the pervasive norm. Marsh (2012) identified that administrators are unwilling to
foster merit pay as it creates friction and conflict within the organization (Marsh,
2012).
In order to understand the similarities and differences between the research on
merit pay implementation and this study, the researcher developed a chart that serves as a
crosswalk between the themes established in this study and those previously cited by
Rice et al. (2012) and Marsh (2012). This crosswalk is illustrated in Table 10.
Table 10
Connection Between Barriers Identified by Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012) with this
Study
Marsh (2012) and
Rice et al. (2012)
Research Findings

Status Quo

Egalitarian

Differentiated

Stakeholder Support

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Teacher Evaluation

Weak

Weak

Moderate
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Table 10—Continued
Marsh (2012) and
Rice et al. (2012)
Research Findings
Sustainability
Culture
Conflict Avoidance

Status Quo

Egalitarian

Differentiated

Weak

Weak

Weak

Moderate

Moderate

Moderate

Strong

Strong

Weak

Source: Marsh, J. (2012). The micro-politics of implementing a school based bonus policy: The case of the
New York City’s compensation committees, Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 34, 367-390.
Rice et al. (2012). The persistent problems and confounding challenges of educator incentives: The case of
TIF in Prince George’s County Maryland, Educational Policy, 26, 892-931.

Three labels were identified to compare findings from March (2012) and Rice et
al. (2012) to the current study: strong support, moderate support, and weak support.
Strong support indicates that Marsh (2012) and Rice et al.’s (2012) findings corresponded
to a theme found in one of the categories in this study. For example, Conflict Avoidance
was a theme in both the Status Quo and Egalitarian categories that matched the findings
of Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012). A finding of moderate support represents a
finding of a sub-theme in one of the superintendent categories in this study. There were
three examples of moderate findings in this study. All superintendent categories had
stakeholder support and culture as a sub-theme; thus these findings were labeled as
having a moderate connection with Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012), as they were
sub-themes. The importance of effective teacher evaluation was also a sub-theme of the
differentiated superintendents, and thus achieved identification as a moderate connection
with the findings of Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012).
The label of weak was used when a finding of Marsh (2012) and Rice (2012) was
not supported as a category of response by any of the superintendent groups.
Sustainability was not recognized by any superintendent category, and thus was identified
as having a weak connection to the findings of Marsh (2012) and Rice (2012). Similarly,
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there was a weak connection between teacher evaluation and the Status Quo and
Egalitarian superintendents. Likewise, conflict avoidance was not a concern for the
Differentiated superintendents.
Of note are the themes and sub-themes uncovered in this study that were not
identified by Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012) as being challenges to merit pay
implementation. As shown in Table 11, the superintendents in this study identified five
challenges that were not reflected in the research of Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012).
Table 11
Findings Unique to this Study
Unique Themes

Status Quo

Egalitarian

Differentiated

Accountability

X

X

X

Need for Sanctions

X

X

Merit Pay Research

X

Policy Champion

X

Union Trust

X

As shown in Table 11, the belief in accountability was a significant theme
uncovered in this study that is not reflected in the work of Marsh (2012) and Rice et al.
(2012). The Status Quo and Egalitarian superintendents also identified the need for
sanctions as a challenge. Merit pay research was a theme only with the Status Quo
superintendents, and the need for policy champions and union trust was likewise
identified by the Differentiated superintendents only as challenges and requirements for
implementation. These findings are unique to this study and stand in contrast to the
findings summarized by Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012).
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Summary
In summary, findings indicate that the vast majority of superintendents (74%) in
this study ignored section 1250 of the revised school code by maintaining the existing
status quo system of compensation based on the salary and step scale increases system.
Approximately 18% of the districts implemented an egalitarian system of a small bonus
payable to the teachers based on teacher evaluation. A small percentage of the districts
(8%) developed a differentiated compensation system that replaced the salary and step
system. This study also uncovered the shared belief by all superintendents that shifting
the teacher compensation system to one wherein teachers were accountable for their
performance would be preferred to the current salary and step model. This belief in the
importance of accountability did not, however, lead to the implementation of merit pay
for the Status Quo and Egalitarian superintendents. Of more importance for them was
avoiding conflict. The prevailing number of superintendents believed that implementing
merit pay by removing the salary and step scale would result in devastating
consequences. As a result, these superintendents were steadfast in not implementing
merit pay, even though it was legislatively mandated, unless there were sanctions
attached to force compliance. From their perspective, without sanctions, the merit pay
requirement represented empty legislation.
While all superintendents in this study shared a belief in the importance of teacher
accountability and a rejection of the salary step and scale model in theory, only the
Differentiated superintendents acted fully on this belief. By contrast, the differentiated
superintendents focused more on how to implement section 1250. They identified the
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need to have a policy champion lead the process, and the requirement of gaining union
trust and having a fair teacher evaluation system.
Research by Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012) listed five barriers or challenges
to merit pay implementation. The connection between their findings and those in this
study were “all over the board,” depending on the category of superintendents. Strong
support was noted for conflict avoidance, moderate support for stakeholder support and
culture, and weak support for teacher evaluation and sustainability. Of note were the
findings in this study that were not consistent with the findings of Marsh (2012) and Rice
et al. (2012). In this study, accountability, the need for sanctions, concern over merit pay
as defined in the research literature, the need for a policy champion, and the importance
of union trust all surfaced.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The overarching purpose of this phenomenological study was to investigate the
lived experiences of nine superintendents responsible for the implementation of a midwestern state’s legislation (Public Act 205 section 1250 of the School Code) requiring the
compensation of teachers be based upon job performance and job accomplishments.
More specifically, this study sought to: (1) discover how selected superintendents in
Michigan school districts understand and responded to section 1250 of the revised school
code requiring merit teacher compensation; (2) to uncover the influences and contextual
conditions that guided superintendents as they made decisions in response to section
1250; (3) to discern if the influences and contextual conditions were different between
those superintendents that implemented section 1250 with those that did not; and (4) to
determine if the influences and contextual conditions experienced by the superintendents
in this study differed from those identified by Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012).
Participants in this study were divided into three categories based on their level of
responsiveness to this legislative fiat.
In this final chapter, the researcher provides a brief review of the study procedures
and a summary of the findings of this study presented from the context of the study’s four
research questions. These salient findings will be presented for each research question
from the perspective on how they support, contradict, and/or identify new findings that
previous studies have failed to recognize or investigate. Afterwards, the researcher
follows this section by providing his perspectives on how the findings in this study can
inform present and future superintendents. Finally, this chapter concludes by providing
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recommendations to other researchers that wish to investigate a similar phenomenon
considered in this doctoral dissertation. The recommendations may help to guide
policymakers and practitioners as they seek ways to implement merit pay statutes.
Study Procedures
This study relied upon personal interviews with nine practicing superintendents in
a mid-western state. Potential superintendents in this study were identified based on their
response to the 2012 Mackinac Center Merit Pay Survey (Van Beek & Sapulding, 2012).
The researcher divided the 114 superintendents who responded to the survey into one of
three groups. These groups were: (1) those that ignored section 1250 of the school code
and maintained their existing teacher compensation system, labeled as Status Quo; (2)
those that simultaneously maintained the existing teacher compensation system, but also
provided a small merit bonus to teachers, labeled as Egalitarian; and (3) those who
eliminated the current teacher compensation system in favor of a new merit-based
compensation model, labeled as Differentiated.
Three superintendents from each of three categories for a total of nine
superintendents were contacted and invited to participate in the study. They included both
male and female superintendents, superintendents from rural, urban, and suburban
settings, and superintendents from northern, central, and southern mid-western regions of
this state. Open-ended interviews were conducted with superintendents over a 3-month
period and later transcribed for data analysis and interpretation. The subjects checked the
transcripts for accuracy. Based on the analysis of the transcripts, themes were identified,
coded, and used as the basis for answering the research questions posed in this study.
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Summary of Findings
In 2010, this mid-western state’s school code was revised requiring districts
to:
Implement and maintain a method of compensation for its teachers and
school administrators that includes job performance and job
accomplishments as a significant factor in determining compensation and
additional compensation. (PA 205, MCL 380.1250, 2010)
Section 1250 of the revised school code represents an attempt to change the
existing compensation system for teachers, which is based on years of service and
educational levels to one based on merit. This policy mandate is at odds with the nearly
universal method of compensating teachers (i.e., the salary and step model) and ignores
the long history of failed attempts to implement the merit-based compensation programs
articulated by Burns et al. (2009), Springer (2009), Heyburn (2010), Podursky and
Springer (2007), and Murnane and Cohen (1986). More recently, Marsh (2012) and Rice
et al. (2012) identified five key barriers and challenges to merit pay implementation. This
study interviewed nine superintendents that represented three different responses to the
policy mandate. The sections below explore the various purposes of this study within the
context of the study’ findings in further detail.
Purpose 1: Discover How Superintendents Understood and Responded to Section
1250 of the Revised School Code
The first purpose of this study was to discover how selected superintendents in
Michigan school districts understood and responded to the requirements of section 1250
of the revised school code. Findings in this study support existing research that
acknowledges merit pay adoption is challenging to accomplish, difficult to sustain, and
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limited its effectiveness. In this study, the majority of districts did not change from the
existing salary and step model of compensation to one based on merit. This response was
consistent with research that indicates that if policy mandates are at odds with existing
practices, they stand little chance, if any, of success (Berkovich, 2011; Cohen, 2007;
Fowler, 2009; Hess & Downs, 2013; Sproull, 1981). The vast majority of superintendents
who responded to the 2012 Mackinac survey indicated that they ignored the policy
mandate (Van Beek & Spaulding, 2012). From a sample of 114 superintendents, 85 (or
74%) maintained the status quo and failed to implement the policy mandate. A smaller
percentage of superintendents (or 19%) provided a small bonus to teachers, but did not
otherwise alter the compensation system. The smallest group of superintendents (7%)
eliminated the salary and step schedule and replaced it with a merit compensation system.
According to Hess and Downs (2013), policy evasion and minimal compliance occurs
when school administrators exist within a “culture of can’t” (p. 1). They describe schools
as cultures where impediments and obstacles are treated as “absolute prohibitions where
the mindset threatens to undermine hard won reforms and policy requirements” (p. 1).
Berkovich (2011) has an expansive view of the “culture of can’t” when he described the
problem stating:
School leaders and teachers have the ability to interpret policy as they see
fit. When they do not support the change, feel that they cannot be
successful, or expect that it will create negative outcomes, it has little
chance of succeeding. What changes have occurred have not, in either
scale or substance, been what reformers had in mind. In many instances,
schools have largely absorbed reform efforts by folding them into existing
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patterns and practices. Rather than reforms changing the schools, the
schools have changed the reforms or created their own. The culture of
schools is a powerful force in modifying policy reform efforts. (p. 564)
Furthermore, other researchers describe policy mandates as opportunities for
resistance, power struggles, and with policies either not implemented or substantially
modified during implementation (Berkovich, 2011; Cohen, 2007; Fowler, 2009; Sproull,
1981). This lack of policy implementation is what Cohen (2007) called the “dilemma
between policy and practice,” wherein the policy fails to change practice in any
substantive manner (p. 515). Richardson et al. (1993) further stated, “few schools and
administrators seem to be jumping at the chance to do things differently, even when
mandates are in place” (p. 3). This study provided additional support for Richardson’s
(1993) view that only a few schools make changes, even when required by policy
mandate. The findings in this study further validate previous research suggesting the
likelihood of widespread policy evasion, and the resulting lack of adoption of the merit
pay policy requirement (Cohen, 2007; Berkovich, 2011; Fowler, 2009; Richardson, 1993;
Sproul 1981).
Purpose 2: Uncover Influences and Contextual Conditions That Guided
Superintendents
The second purpose of the study was to uncover the influences and contextual
conditions that guided superintendents as they made decisions in response to section 1250
of the revised school code. This study generally supports existing research that has
chronicled a set of challenges and barriers to successful merit pay implementation. In this
study, the influences and contextual conditions guided superintendents when they made
decisions regarding implementation of merit pay. These influences included the
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following: the importance of accountability, conflict avoidance, the need for sanctions,
the lack of stakeholder support, the lack of cultural fit between merit pay and schools, the
importance of policy champions, the need for union trust, and the negative influence of
past research on merit pay. These sets of themes and sub-themes are described in Table 8.
These findings have support in the research literature regarding merit pay implementation
as noted by Gardner and Meeuwsen (2009), Heyburn (2010), Marsh (2012), McDonnell
and Elmore (1987), Murnane and Cohen (1986), Neal (2008), Podursky and Springer
(2007), Rice et al. (2012), Springer (2009), and Timar and Kirp (1989).
There was one finding in this study that has not been referenced in the previous
research regarding merit pay. Superintendents in this study expressed universal belief in
the importance of accountability and the need to alter the existing salary and step model
of compensation; however, this belief did not necessarily lead to implementing merit pay
or moving away from the current compensation system, as shown by the results in the
Mackinac Survey (Van Beek & Spaulding, 2012). It would appear that superintendents
were caught between what they like to do and what they actually did. The Status Quo and
Egalitarian superintendents explained this contradiction by presenting it in terms of a
cost-benefit analysis. They anticipated the cost and challenge of eliminating the current
compensation system in favor of merit pay as being too difficult to implement. The
perceived cost was too great for the benefit. It was their belief that the conflict resulting
from implementing section 1250 would damage their ability to get things done, and have
potential negative consequences on their career and continued employment.
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As Rogers (2003) noted, change leads to conflict. The more dissimilar the change
to existing practice and norms, the more likely conflict and resulting failures can be
expected. As Rogers (2003) noted:
Compatibility is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as
consistent with the values, past experiences, and needs of the potential
adopters. An idea that is more compatible is less uncertain to the potential
adopter and fits more closely with the current practice, is likely to be
implemented. Innovations incompatible with current values and practices
lead to conflict and can easily be blocked. (p. 240)
Belief alone is not enough to ensure implementation of merit pay even when
required by law. Other factors are more important than the belief in the concept of merit
pay. As Michael Lewis (2017) observed in his recent book The Undoing Project, “the
more items there were to undo in order to create some alternative reality, the less likely
the mind was to undo them” (p. 302). Undoing a teacher compensation system would
require a massive change in practice and procedure, even though such a change can be
envisioned and even believed in. It was not compatible with current practice, would
create conflict, and thus deemed impossible to undo.
Purpose 3: Discern Differences Among Superintendents
The third purpose of the study was to discern the differences in influence and
contextual conditions between the superintendents that implemented section 1250 of the
revised school code and those superintendents that did not implement the state statue.
Table 9 lists the themes identified in all categories of superintendents. The Status Quo
and Egalitarian superintendents, and the Differentiated superintendents were affected by
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different contextual conditions and influences. The key reasons the Status Quo and
Egalitarian superintendents gave for their actions included conflict avoidance, the need
for sanctions, the lack of stakeholder support, and cultural incompatibility. This differs
from the Differentiated superintendents who did not recognize conflict and the need for
sanctions as barriers to implementing section 1250. Instead, they identified the need for a
policy champion as a key to successful adoption. The Differentiated superintendents did
not share or were not influenced by the same challenges identified by the Status Quo and
Egalitarian superintendents.
It is apparent that the differences between the Status Quo and Egalitarian and the
Differentiated superintendents were dependent on how they framed the barriers (Boleman
& Deal, 2008). The Status Quo and Egalitarian superintendents identified influences and
contextual conditions from the perspective of “I can’t because,” while the Differentiated
superintendents framed their responses and decisions as “I can and did because.” For
example, the Status Quo and Egalitarian superintendents referenced the inevitable
conflict and the resulting lack of stakeholder support as reasons for why “I can’t”
implement section 1250. They also suggested that only with sanctions attached to the
school code revision would they make compensation system changes; that is, “I can’t
until the state forces me to.” (Overall, these perceptions matched Berkovich’s (2011)
description of school leaders operating within a “culture of can’t” (p. 564).
The Differentiated superintendents, on the other hand, framed their concerns
differently. They believed that merit pay would lead to teacher accountability, but they
also identified the importance of their personal accountability to the policy mandate. It
was the law, and it was their obligation to follow it. While the Status Quo and Egalitarian

104

superintendents identified stakeholder support as a barrier, the Differentiated
superintendents recognized the importance of gaining teacher support and worked to
develop it. They had the “I can” attitude, instead of the “I can’t” perspective. While the
differentiated superintendents recognized the engrained social norms and long history of
the current compensation system, they felt changes were possible. They viewed conflict
that might result as positive and necessary ingredient for change. As Flessa (2009)
pointed out, “conflict offers a context for inquiry, organizational learning, and
change…conflict becomes constructive for the community and the school” (p. 340).
How the superintendents framed the problem led to action or inaction.
The Differentiated superintendents also identified the importance of a policy
champion as key to the success of their implementation efforts. In this case, the policy
champions came from the local Intermediate School District (ISD). An ISD leader
introduced the district superintendents to the revised school code requirements, and
established a process by which the individual districts and superintendents created unique
implementation solutions. Rogers (2003) described policy champions such as those in the
ISD as individuals in influential positions who lead others and overcome resistance (p.
403). Schon (1963) echoed this sentiment by suggesting that “a new idea either finds a
policy champion or it dies” (p. 84). Effective policy champions spread messages about
the innovation with their interpersonal network links. As Rogers (2003) stated,
“interpersonal networks among neighbors are a powerful influence on individual
decisions to adopt…geography is important” (p. 335). They encouraged superintendents
and districts to reinvent solutions and encouraged collaboration. In a sense, the policy
champion “drew a line in the sand,” and initiated the implementation by espousing the
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“we can” frame. The importance of collaboration, reinvention, and policy champions
matches the literature base (Hess & Downs, 2003; Rogers, 2003; Schon, 1963). The only
superintendents in this study that achieved success implementing merit pay were those
who had a policy champion assisting them in an environment of collaboration and
reinvention. This fits with Marsh’s (2012) conclusion when she noted:
The only schools that had differentiated merit pay were schools with a
change agent. These individuals embraced merit pay and the potential
conflict resulting from it as a means to motivate, reward and catalyze
change. Change agents don’t work in isolation. They need peer support,
expert guidance, and reassurance. (p. 179)
Purpose 4: Determine if Findings Match Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012)
The fourth, and final purpose of this study was to determine if the findings in this
study matched those as defined by Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012). Findings in this
study generally support the contentions of Marsh (2012) and Rice (2012). This was
especially true as noted previously in Table 10 with the Status Quo and Egalitarian
superintendents, as they shared three of the five barriers to merit pay implementation as
defined Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012). This includes what the researcher termed a
strong relationship with conflict avoidance, and a moderate connection with stakeholder
support and culture. The Differentiated superintendents also had a relationship with three
of five findings of Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012), but it was less strong. They
showed a moderate connection with stakeholder support, culture, and teacher evaluation.
Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012) have not identified the enabling conditions that led to
merit pay adoption. Rather, Marsh (2012) and Rice et al.’s (2012) focus has been on the
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barriers and challenges that limit merit pay implementation, which fit with the results
identified from the Status Quo and Egalitarian superintendents in this study.
There are findings in this study that have not been previously referenced in the
research literature on merit pay implementation. This includes, as previously noted in
Table 11, a set of influences and contextual conditions not referenced by Marsh (2012)
and Rice et al. (2012). Specifically, the shared belief in accountability by all
superintendents has not been previously reported. While referenced in studies on policy
implementation, the need for sanctions and the importance of policy champions has not
been connected to research regarding merit pay implementation (Flessa, 2009; Hess &
Downs, 2003; Marsh, 2012; Rogers, 2003; Schon, 1963). In general, the focus in the
research literature has been on why merit pay has not worked, rather than an enunciation
of the influences and contextual conditions that lead to success. This may be the result of
an overall lack of sustained successful merit pay programs upon which to conduct
research.
Conclusions
For superintendents, section 1250 of the revised school code requires changing
the compensation system for teachers to one of increased accountability. Based on the
results of this study, superintendents share a strong belief in accountability. This does not
mean, however, that this belief will be translated into new compensation systems for
teachers based on merit. Superintendents are presented with what Cohen (2003) described
as the “dilemma between policy and practice” (p. 515). The dilemma and resulting lack
of implementation appears to be the consequence of a set of influences and contextual
conditions that includes concerns over inevitable conflict, lack of stakeholder support,

107

incompatibility with the cultural norms of schools, and the lack of sanctions attached to
this policy mandate. Especially problematic for superintendents is the potential for
significant conflict associated with moving away from the salary and step scale. The
benefit in terms of accountability and following the law, are not as powerful for
superintendents as the costs. These costs include inevitable conflict, lack of stakeholder
support, and even potential loss of employment.
Only when a narrow set of conditions exists does the implementation of section
1250 of the revised school code take root. These conditions appear to include leadership
in the form of a policy champion who can mobilize local superintendents to develop
merit pay models unique to their settings, a strong belief in individual and teacher
accountability, and the need for stakeholder support and collaboration. Such conditions
seem to be rare, and it is unlikely that section 1250 and merit pay implementation will be
adopted with fidelity any time in the foreseeable future.
Recommendations
Changing the status quo is difficult. The existing compensation system for
teachers has withstood years of tinkering, policy mandates, and an assortment of research
initiatives. It would appear that the formula for creating sustained changes in teacher
compensation has been elusive. Based on the findings from this study, further research is
suggested which may offer additional insight into the enabling conditions for the
development and sustainability of merit pay. The literature base is extensive in regards to
the challenges and barriers to performance based compensation and the relatively limited
impact of merit pay on student achievement. What is more limited is our understanding
of the underlying influences and contextual conditions that lead to success. When it is
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successfully implemented, why? This question has not been answered in any substantive
manner.
Based on the findings of this study, it would be beneficial to learn more about the
depth and influence the belief in accountability has in creating enabling conditions for
merit pay adoption. For example, can a strong belief in accountability influence
compensation change when it is combined with sanctions, or is the belief in
accountability enough? Another avenue of exploration is a comparison of other merit pay
policy mandates that contain sanctions versus those that do not. When sanctions are
attached to performance-based compensation mandates, does this lead to greater
implementation? It is clear that section 1250 of the school code is vague and lacks
sanctions. If clarity and sanctions were defined in policy mandates, would they change
merit pay adoption levels? Does policy clarity lead to more sustained adoption?
An enabling condition that appears to be critical in this study was the role of
effective leadership in the form of a policy champion to guide the process of
implementation. In this case, such leadership was housed in the local ISD. It would
appear that the use of a policy champion at the ISD level could help facilitate
superintendent understanding of policy and encourage collaborative action and
reinvention at the local level. Shields (2012) expressed that progress is achieved when
“all key parties are involved, there is broad agreement on the values underlying the
model, and they work together to make changes as needed” (p. 3). Opinion leaders who
can mobilize superintendents and districts to work together in reinventing the
requirements to fit their circumstances would seem to be critical. Further work needs to
be done on this role, especially in the context of the ISD. Does the positioning of ISD
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leadership create a critical mass of support for an innovation and does it develop peer
pressure creates for an easier path for adoption? These questions are ripe for further
investigations.
As Marsh (2012) has indicated, there is limited information on the strategic
decision-making process of leaders charged with merit pay implementation. There is
considerable room to add to the literature on why educational leaders change
compensation practices, how they do it, and the factors that influence their decisions
when faced with policy mandates. The literature is rich with information regarding
barriers to implementation, but limited in regards to enabling conditions. There is also
limited information on what needs to be “un-done” and “unlearned” when making
changes to compensation practices. Policy mandates that articulate vague actions are not
a recipe for change. Defining the conditions for change has yet to be determined
however. Therefore, it is recommended that this study be replicated to provide additional
evidence of the accuracy of the findings of this study. Future studies should consider
conducting a quantitative study that would ensure the sample is representative of the
population of superintendents in Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA). A
study of this nature would increase the precision of the study’s statistical estimates.
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Categorization of Districts Based on Response to P.A. 205
(Section 1250 of the Revised School Code)
The Mackinac Center requested in 2012, information from public school districts
regarding their compliance to P.A. 205. 106 school districts complied and provided
information to the Mackinac Center. Information on an additional 8 school districts was
further collected by the researcher bringing the total number of potential
districts/superintendents eligible for this study to 114 districts.
Each of these districts was categorized into one of five possible categories based on their
response to P.A. 205, section 1250 of the revised school code. These categories defined
as Status Quo, Egalitarian and Differentiated. A definition of the requirements for
inclusion into one of these categories is listed below:
Revised Categories of Response to Merit Pay Requirement
Compensation

Status Quo

Egalitarian

Differentiated

Equal Bonus

No

Yes

No

Bonus

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Characteristic

Differentiated

Keep Salary/Step
Schedule

Based on the categories of response, all school districts in the sample (n: 114) were
categorized into one of the five typologies.
Status Quo:
Egalitarian
Differentiated:

85 districts
21 districts
9 districts

74% of sample
18% of sample
8% of sample
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Interview Guide

__________________________________ _____________ _______ to _________
Subject

Date

Start

End

__________________________________ __________________________________
School District

Location

Introduction: “As I have communicated to you, I am in the process of
completing my Ph.D. in Educational Leadership from Western Michigan University. Part
of this process is the completion of a dissertation. I have chosen the implementation of
Public Act 205, Section 1250 of the Revised School Code that deals with merit pay. My
purpose is to learn your thoughts, ideas, and reflection concerning this new merit pay
requirement.”
Interview Purpose: “Interviews will be conducted with nine superintendents
from nine school districts in Michigan. You have indicated previously your willingness to
participate in this interview and I am grateful for your participation. The purpose is to
discover your thoughts concerning merit pay including how your district has responded to
section 1250. There are no wrong answers to the questions I ask during the interview.”
Interview Process: “This interview guide will structure our conversation today as
well as the other conversations I will have with superintendents. I will audio-record the
conversation and have it transcribed and return to you for your editing and accuracy.
Once the transcripts have been reviewed by you, I will analyze the data for common
themes and patterns. This information will then be used to prepare the dissertation. All
information is confidential and all names (including districts and individuals) will be
changed to protect confidentiality.”
Questions: “Before we begin, do you have any questions about the purpose of the
interviews and the process I will use? After reviewing this information, are you still
willing to participate? If so, then I need you to sign the consent agreement. Do you have
any other questions?”
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Interview Questions
Overview Questions
1) Provide information about your school district. How many students and teachers?
2) When was your last contract completed? What was your role in the negotiation
process?
3) How would you describe administration’s relationship with the teachers union or
association?
4) How is it determined in your district how teachers are paid?
5) How long has this process been in place?
6) How well from your perception has the compensation process for teachers
worked?
How do Superintendents understand and have responded to section 1250 of the
school code (also known as PA 205)?
7) What is your understanding of PA 205?
8) What did you do in response to PA 205?
If superintendent did not implement PA 205…
9) What was your thinking in regards to merit pay?
10) Ask additional follow-up questions based on reasons to further clarify…
11) What has been the response of other administrators and board members to PA 205
and the decision not to implement PA 205?
12) What has been the response from the teachers?
13) What has been the response from community members?
14) Are you planning on changing your teacher compensation process in the future? If
so, what changes are you planning?
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15) If you were asked to give another superintendent advice who is wondering if they
should implement merit pay, what would you tell them?

If superintendent did implement PA 205…
16) Describe what the differences are between how you compensated teachers before
and the current process?
17) What guided your thinking in regards to implementing merit pay?
18) What were the challenges associated with implementing this change?
19) How did you deal with these challenges?
20) Ask additional follow-up questions based on reasons to further clarify…
21) What has been the response from other administrators and board members?
22) What has been the response from teachers?
23) What has been the response from community members?
24) In general, how successful has this change been?
25) What kinds of issues (both potential and actual) occurred because of PA 205?
26) Are you planning on making additional compensation changes in the future?
27) If you were asked to give another superintendent advice who is wondering if they
should implement merit pay, what would you tell them?

Additional Questions (for all Superintendents):
28) Why was PA 205 from your perception, enacted?
29) Do you believe that merit pay has the potential to lead to better outcomes for your
students? Teaching staff? Administration?
30) What do you expect will happen in the future in regards to merit pay in the shortterm and in the long term?
31) Do you expect that merit pay will remain a requirement in the future?
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32) Is there anything else on this subject that would better help me understand what
has happened in regards to merit pay in your district?
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Initial Phone Conversation Guide

“Hello, my name is Mark Tompkins and I’m the superintendent for Harbor
Springs Public Schools and also a graduate student at Western Michigan University,
where I’m working on completing my dissertation in educational leadership. I’m calling
to see if you would be interested in being interviewed as part of my dissertation research.
The topic of my dissertation is examining teacher compensation in the context of Public
Act 205 (revised school code 1250) which requires some form of merit pay be part of
how we pay teachers. This research is focused on understanding how and why
superintendents have responded to this legislation. I plan on interviewing a total of nine
different superintendents in the state who have responded to PA 205 in a variety of
ways.”
“If you choose to participate in this study I plan on coming to interview you at
your convenience in the next month. I plan on tape recording the interview and then
transcribing the notes from our conversation. The interview should take between 1 and 2
hours. You will have the opportunity to review the transcription to make sure that I
accurately captured our conversation. It is important for you to know that this
conversation will be strictly confidential with pseudonyms that will be used for you and
for your school district. The information that you provide to me will be protected and
secure.”
“Thank you for your interest in participating in this study. To confirm your
participation in this study, I will be sending you a copy of the Consent Agreement which
provides additional details about guidelines, expectations, risks, and benefits of this
study. After reviewing this information, if you choose to participate, please return the
signed Consent Agreement in the self-addressed stamped envelope. Please call me at
(231) 881-8500 or e-mail me with any questions at mtompkins@harborps.org – I would
be glad to answer them. After I receive your consent, then I will be calling you to
arrange a time to meet for the interview. Thank you and I look forward to meeting you.”
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Department of Educational Leadership, Research, and Technology
Dr. Walter L. Burt, Principal Investigator
Mark Tompkins, Student Investigator
A Case Study of Superintendents’ Response to the Implementation of P.A. 205 In
Selected Michigan School Districts: Challenges and Opportunities

You are invited to participate in a study examining the impact of P.A. 205. The
study is being conducted by Mark Tompkins, Superintendent of Harbor Springs Public
Schools in Harbor Springs Michigan, and a doctoral student at Western Michigan
University under the supervision of Dr. Walter L. Burt.
The following is provided for you to determine if you wish to participate in this
study. You should note that you are free to decide not to participate in this research or
withdraw at any period without impacting your relationship with the Western Michigan
University or the researcher.
The primary purpose of this study is to understand how school superintendents in
Michigan have responded to P.A. 205 which mandates that some form of compensation
for teachers is based on job performance and job accomplishments. This study will
examine the various ways superintendents have responded to P.A. 205 and to understand
the contextual conditions and influences which guided the decisions they made.
In this study, the research of Marsh (2012) and Rice et al. (2012) will serve as a
guide for understanding the issues associated with the implementation of alternative
forms of compensation for teachers. This study will shed light on how these same
implementation issues have played out in Michigan.
If you decide to participate you will be asked to participate in an interview lasting
between 1 to 2 hours. The researcher may find it necessary to conduct a follow-up
interview for clarification purposes. These interviews will be recorded and transcribed for
accuracy. To ensure accuracy of reporting, you will be provided the opportunity to
review and edit your responses. At any time in the interview process, you will have the
opportunity to withdraw from the interview, decline to comment on any questions, or
request that the researcher to turn off the interview equipment.
You will also be given the opportunity to ask any questions prior to or during the
interview. Upon completion of the study, the researcher will provide all participants with
a summary of the findings within the study. Please be assured that the researcher will
maintain confidentiality of your participation, and no name of person or district will be
reported or otherwise released.
Pseudonyms will be used for you and the district (i.e. school district 1 – SD1;
superintendent 1- S1). The written transcripts will be stored in a locked filing cabinet in
the office of the Principal Investigator, Dr. Walter L. Burt, on the campus of Western
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Michigan University for at least three years. The audio transcripts will be destroyed once
the transcription is complete and following your review and approval.
There are no known risks associated with this research other than the discomfort
associated with not implanting P.A. 205. In order to minimize this discomfort, all
confidentiality protocols will be strictly enforced.
There is an abundance of research on the effects of merit pay on student
achievement and the challenges of sustaining this model of compensation. There is
however, only limited research on the strategic decision-making processes and contextual
conditions surrounding merit pay as an educational reform tool. It is not known why
superintendents either implement merit pay or fail to implement it. Your participation
will help answer this question.
If you have any questions concerning this study please contact Mark Tompkins
(the student investigator) at (231) 881-8500 or via e-mail at mtompkins@harborps.org.
You may also contact my doctoral dissertation Chair, Dr. Walter L. Burt at Western
Michigan University. His telephone number is (269) 387-1821 if you have any questions
or concerns during the study.
This consent document has been approved for use by the researcher for one year
by the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) as shown by the stamped
date and signature of the board chair in the upper right corner of this document. Do not
participate in this study if the stamped date is older than one year. A signed copy of this
consent form will be given to you for your records.
__________________________________
Participant

____________________
Date

__________________________________
Consent obtained by interviewer/student
Investigator

____________________
Date
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